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Abstract
Logic programming has developed as a rich field, built over a logical substratum whose
main constituent is a nonclassical form of negation, sometimes coexisting with classi-
cal negation. The field has seen the advent of a number of alternative semantics, with
Kripke-Kleene semantics, the well-founded semantics, the stable model semantics, and
the answer-set semantics standing out as the most successful. We show that all aforemen-
tioned semantics are particular cases of a generic semantics, in a framework where classical
negation is the unique form of negation and where the literals in the bodies of the rules can
be ‘marked’ to indicate that they can be the targets of hypotheses. A particular semantics
then amounts to choosing a particular marking scheme and choosing a particular set of
hypotheses. When a literal belongs to the chosen set of hypotheses, all marked occurrences
of that literal in the body of a rule are assumed to be true, whereas the occurrences of
that literal that have not been marked in the body of the rule are to be derived in order
to contribute to the firing of the rule. Hence the notion of hypothetical reasoning that is
presented in this framework is not based on making global assumptions, but more subtly
on making local, contextual assumptions, taking effect as indicated by the chosen marking
scheme on the basis of the chosen set of hypotheses. Our approach offers a unified view
on the various semantics proposed in logic programming, classical in that only classical
negation is used, and links the semantics of logic programs to mechanisms that endow
rule-based systems with the power to harness hypothetical reasoning.
KEYWORDS: Kripke-Kleene semantics, answer-set semantics, stable model semantics,
well-founded semantics, classical negation, contextual hypotheses, hypothetical reasoning
1 Motivation
In this paper, we present a small part of a general framework called parametric logic,
some of whose concepts have very practical motivations; the notion of contextual
hypothesis and the associated notion of hypothetical reasoning are two concepts of
this kind. A contextual hypothesis, according to which a condition can be assumed
to be true in some specific contexts rather than globally, is important in web search,
as the information sought by users occurs in documents and is found to be relevant
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thanks to the contextual relationships it bears to the input keywords. Hypothetical
reasoning is relevant to the development of decision support systems. Effective
systems must give users the power to explore and experiment so that they can
better understand the domain; they must provide the degree of control that users
demand, which the type of hypothetical reasoning to be described here offers. We
commence the paper will a simple worked example that introduces the practical
aspects of the notions of contextual hypothesis and hypothetical reasoning, and
motivates the formal material that follows.
Many decision support systems encode expert knowledge as a set of rules. In
practice knowledge bases may have to deal with thousands of rules. Keeping that
order of magnitude in mind, imagine a toy example of a knowledge base consisting of
rules all of the form if condition1 and . . . and conditionn then conclusion abstracted
as follows.
p0 ← p0 p1 ← p5 p3 ← p0 p4 ← p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p7
p5 ← p4 p6 ← p3 ∧ p4 ∧ p7 p7 ← p6 p8 ← p4
p9 ← p5 ∧ p7 ∧ p8 p10 ← p3 ∧ p6
We could consider a more general set of rules in which some conclusions would
be associated with more than one conjunction of conditions, but that would not
bring any additional insight. Some of the conditions and conclusions could also
carry out negative information, hence be of the form ¬p; this example only uses
positive information in order to simplify notation, at no conceptual cost since what
will be said of the previous set of rules would be said mutatis mutandis of a set
of rules that also encodes negative information (the fact that we treat positive
and negative information similarly is one of the hallmarks of our approach, as will
be seen across the whole paper). The above set of rules can be represented by the
following diagram, that can be read as a boolean circuit with nothing but and gates
(with a more general set of rules, we would also have or gates, and some conditions
would be preceded by a not gate).
p0
p1
p2
p3
p4
p8
p5
p6 p7
p10
p9
An important feature of the circuit is that it models a reactive process: it contains
a number of loops, which reveal circular arguments. This does not necessarily indi-
cate that the representation of knowledge is flawed. For instance, the deflationary
economic model posits that a drop in prices delays consumption, that increases
inventories, that forces companies to sell their stock at a lower price. Knowledge
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representation, when applied to domains where amplifiers and reinforcement mech-
anisms are at work, usually results in knowledge bases with loops.
In order to establish a correct diagnosis or take the right course of actions, a user
will often want to query the decision support system on how a given conclusion can
be derived; logically speaking, this is a form of abductive reasoning. Getting back to
our example, let us query how p9 can be derived. The system could provide a (pos-
sibly minimal) set X of pieces of information that, added to the set of rules, permit
p9 to be derived; the members of X would then be assumed to be true globally. But
the system can do better. It can provide a (possibly minimal) set of occurrences
of conditions X in some rules that, supposed to be true at those locations and at
those locations only, make the resulting, stronger set of rules able to derive p9; the
members of X are then assumed to be true locally. Moreover, under this scenario,
the system can also indicate which conditions can be confirmed (inferred alongside
p9). With our running example, this can be done in many different ways. For in-
stance, using check marks to indicate which occurrences of conditions to select and
imposing that they be minimal, the system could return
p0 ← p0 p1 ← p5
X
p3 ← p0 p4 ← p1 ∧ p2
X
∧ p7
X
p5 ← p4 p6 ← p3
X
∧ p4 ∧ p7
X
p7 ← p6 p8 ← p4
p9 ← p5 ∧ p7 ∧ p8 p10 ← p3 ∧ p6
and indicate that making p2, p3, p5 and p7 true at the selected locations allows one
to infer p9 and confirm p5 and p7, but neither p2 nor p3. Or it could return
p0 ← p0 p1 ← p5 p3 ← p0 p4 ← p1 ∧ p2
X
∧ p7
p5 ← p4
X
p6 ← p3
X
∧ p4
X
∧ p7 p7 ← p6
X
p8 ← p4
p9 ← p5 ∧ p7 ∧ p8 p10 ← p3 ∧ p6
and indicate that making p2, p3, p4 and p6 true at the selected locations allows
one to infer p9 and confirm p4 and p6, but neither p2 nor p3. Since they are not
confirmed, p2 and p3 make it possible to derive p9 by playing a ‘foundational’ role,
and their marked occurrences indicate where that role is played in the underlying
derivation of p9. On the other hand, p5 and p7 (first marked set of rules), or p4
and p6 (second marked set of rules), being confirmed, make it possible to derive p9
thanks to relationships of ‘interdependence’, and their marked occurrences indicate
which rules use them as hypotheses in the underlying derivation of p9 before these
relationships take effect and the hypotheses become unnecessary as they get con-
firmed.1 An output of this kind is of great interest to users who, given a confirmed
selected condition ϕ, can investigate further the feedbacks in which ϕ is involved,
which might result in valuable findings or prompt users to amend the knowledge
1 The minimality constraint is essential in this discussion: if the rules were q3 ← q2 and q2 ← q1,
the aim was to derive q3, and the system returned q3 ← q2
X
and q2 ← q1
X
, then q2 would be
confirmed though q2 is not in a relationship of interdependence to itself.
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base—they will be all the more prepared to this eventuality the number of rules is
larger. Of course, a well designed system will assist in this task.
Other scenarios of interest are possible. Users could first select some occurrences
of conditions to indicate the contexts in which those conditions can be assumed to be
true, and then list some of those conditions. For instance, users could select, in some
rules, some occurrences of the conditions p1, p5 and p6, before listing successively
p1, then p1 and p5, then p1 and p6, then p1, p5 and p6, to ‘activate’ first only
some, and eventually all, selected occurrences of conditions, and find out what the
implications are, what can or cannot be derived as more or fewer assumptions are
made in the preselected contexts. Or users could first list conditions, say p1, p5
and p6, and then experiment by selecting various occurrences of those conditions,
starting for instance with all of them (so ignoring the context), and then removing
some occurrences, hence taking the context into account to find out how that affects
the conclusions that can be derived, or the conditions that can be confirmed. Extra
constraints can be imposed on which conditions should be confirmed or not, or on
the relationships between confirmed conditions, etc.
What does all this have to do with the semantics of logic programs, which is what
this paper focuses on? Well, we will see that the notions of hypothetical reasoning
and contextual hypothesis can do more than enrich the field of logic programming.
They allow one to look at its fundamental semantics from a novel perspective. We
will see that these fundamental semantics can be all unified under the umbrella
of contextual, hypothetical reasoning. They correspond to particular, highly con-
strained, ways of selecting occurrences of conditions and of choosing hypotheses.
The notion of confirmation plays a pivotal role in one semantics (the well-founded
semantics). In the previous example, conditions and conclusions were all positive,
making it impossible to derive a contradiction. When conditions and conclusions
can be negative, a notion of nonrefutation naturally enters the stage to express that
contextually hypothesising p does not allow one to infer ¬p, or that contextually
hypothesising ¬p does not allow one to infer p. The notion of nonrefutation plays
a crucial role in other semantics (the stable model and the answer-set semantics).
Revisiting the fundamental semantics of logic programs under the light of hypothet-
ical reasoning and contextual hypothesis is of conceptual and theoretical interest;
in particular, it supports the view that, in contrast to the traditional work in the
field, logic programming does not need nonclassical negation, and that positive and
negative information can obey a duality principle. As importantly, we can capitalise
on the fact that the traditional semantics have been extensively studied and are
very well understood, and be confident that expressing them as particular forms of
hypothetical reasoning will help understand the latter and come up with valuable
constraints and fruitful strategies to exploit it fully.
We have introduced the key idea of choosing a set X of conditions and contex-
tually selecting in some rules some occurrences of conditions, that will be made
‘active’ if they belong to X . Formalising this idea precisely, omitting no detail, in a
very general setting (in particular because it is first-order rather than propositional)
requires a bit of work, but the informal description where check marks are used to
capture the notion of contextual hypothesis actually says it all and does not hide any
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essential technicality. We will use this description again. It does not only support
the intuition and illustrate the mathematical developments. It actually suggests a
very practical, concrete interface, where users click on some occurrences of condi-
tions, activating or deactivating them as they interact with their decision support
system. But users will need to be guided, they should not click arbitrarily, they will
need and request some constraints that will help them experiment effectively and
beneficially. One can imagine for instance that some occurrences of conditions are
dimmed out in real time to indicate that under the present circumstances, they are
‘unclickable’. This paper will not dwell into these considerations though; the first
task is to provide the theoretical foundations to practical problems of this kind.
2 Background
Since its inception, the field of logic programming has embraced an increasingly
complex diaspora of rules, that is, pairs of formulas referred to as ‘body’ and ‘head’,
with the intention that if the body is true then the head is true. The bodies of the
rules have eventually been allowed to contain both classical negation and nonclassi-
cal negation—classical negation being used to assert falsity, and nonclassical nega-
tion, a form of nonprovability. Classical negation and disjunction have made their
ways into the heads of the rules (see (Minker and Seipel 2002) for a survey). It has
even been advocated to use more than two kinds of negation (Alferes et al. 1996;
Alferes et al. 1998). Also, a large number of constraints on the rules that make
up a logic program have been proposed, based on syntactic constraints or defin-
ability properties (e.g., (Jäger and Stärk 1993)) or on proof-theoretic criteria (e.g.,
(Pedreschi et al. 2002)). All these developments took place as part of the advances
in the field of nonmonotonic reasoning (Minker 1993).
Starting with the simplest case of sets of rules whose heads are atomic formu-
las and whose bodies result from the application of conjunction and disjunction to
atomic formulas only, a recurring question has been: what is the intended meaning
of a set of rules, that translates into: what are the intended interpretations of a
set of rules? Some approaches seek a unique intended interpretation, while other
approaches accommodate many. In a first-order setting, the intended interpreta-
tions have been selected from the class of all structures or from the more restricted
class of all Herbrand structures, that give every individual a unique name. Along-
side the various model-theoretic semantics, proof-theoretic techniques and fixed-
point constructions have been developed (see (Apt and Bol 1994) for a survey).
As the number of approaches increased, a natural line of research has been to ex-
hibit possible relationships between the various frameworks and seek unifications,
with (Loyer et al. 2003) and (Hitzler 2005) as examples of work conducted in the
last decade. This study belongs to that category of papers, but differs from previous
work in many essential ways.
• It offers a model of hypothetical reasoning for knowledge-based systems where
a hypothesis is not conceived of globally as a new fact, but as a statement
meant to be assumed locally and contextually (at some locations in the bodies
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of some rules), that can be subjected to confirmation (if that statement is
eventually derived), or subjected to not being refuted (if no rule ever produces
its negation), or subjected to other constraints, possibly involving the whole
set of chosen hypotheses, or some particular subset.
• Rather than seeking relationships between various semantics of logic pro-
grams, it proposes a natural base semantics, and complements it with a generic
notion of transformation of a logic program. So rather than proposing, for a
given logic program P , a picture of the form
Semantics 1 of P
Semantics 2 of P Semantics 3 of P
it proposes a picture of the form
Base semantics of P
Base semantics
of P +Ω1 E1
Base semantics
of P +Ω2 E2
Base semantics
of P +Ω3 E3
where P+ΩE represents the transformation of P into a new logic program the
bodies of whose rules are possibly weaker than the bodies of the corresponding
rules of P , thanks to a construction that uses a set E of literals conceived of
as potential hypotheses and a set Ω of occurrences of literals in the bodies
of P ’s rules conceived of as possible targets of the hypotheses (these notions
and others used in the semi-formal presentation of Section 2 will be precisely
defined from Section 3 onwards). Semantics 1, 2 and 3 of P then correspond to
particular choices of E and Ω, and intuitively receive the interpretation: in the
bodies of P’s rules, make use of the hypotheses in E locally and contextually
as indicated by Ω, and apply the base semantics.
• It attains a high degree of unification between the semantics of logic programs
considered in this paper, namely, Kripke-Kleene semantics (Fitting 1985), the
well-founded semantics (Gelder et al. 1991), the stable model semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988),
and the answer-set semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991). Kripke-Kleene se-
mantics is closely related to our base semantics, while each of the other three
is obtained by instantiating general principles (constraints on Ω and E) that
determine families of semantics. Other families would be determined by other
principles. Some members of those families, different to the particular mem-
bers of the particular families considered here, might be worth investigating
and have practical use.
• It is classical, in the sense that it uses a unique form of negation, interpreted
classically, and is based on interpretations that assign one of the classical truth
values of true or false to every formula. This is in contrast to many approaches,
for instance frameworks based on Belnap’s 4-valued logic (see (Fitting 1999)),
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or on the extension of the logic of here-and-there, N5, with its 5 truth values
(see (Pearce 2006)).
• Using classical negation as unique form of negation, it remains outside the
realm of nonmonotonic reasoning. It is monotone in both Ω and E: increasing
the targets of hypotheses or the set of potential hypotheses results in stronger
programs, that generate more literals.
• It is symmetric, in the sense that it treats negated atoms and atoms on a par,
and emphasises that the stable model and well-founded semantics, dedicated
to interpreting a nonclassical form of negation, give rise to semantics that are
fully biased towards negated atoms, while the general principle underlying
these semantics is consistent with being totally biased towards nonnegated
atoms, or with being committed to achieving a balance between negated and
nonnegated atoms.
• It applies to general sets of rules, whose heads can be negated atoms and whose
bodies can (but do not have to) be arbitrary infinitary first-order formulas.
• It does not require that intended interpretations be restricted to the class of
Herbrand interpretations.
2.1 Two key principles
Our framework relies on two key principles.
The first principle is that a set of positive rules, that is, rules whose heads are
atomic formulas, can be thought of as a set of rules that are both positive and
negative, that is, rules whose heads are atomic formulas or negations of atomic for-
mulas, where the negative rules are left implicit because they are fully determined
by the positive rules thanks to a duality principle. This idea is far from novel; it
is nothing more than a variation on the notion of Clark’s completion of a logic
program (Clark 1987). Clark’s completion does not transform a set of positive rules
into a set of positive and negative rules, but rather into a set of logical equiva-
lences augmented with unique name axioms. Our formalisation is a streamlined
version of Clark’s completion. With positive rules only, one can only infer some
negative information by failing to generate some positive information—the process
known as negation as finite failure that certainly compels us to adopt the view that
negation in logic programming is essentially nonclassical. But given both positive
and negative rules, one can generate both positive and negative information, and
conceive of negation as finite failure as an ingenious proof technique to generate
negative information from the positive rules only, as an alternative to generating
negative information using both the positive and the negative rules. This paper will
demonstrate that this view is perfectly tenable; classical negation is all one needs,
and negation as finite failure can be understood as part of a more general inference
mechanism that generates nothing but logical consequences. Not surprisingly, this
will result in a semantics which, in case the class of intended interpretations is the
class of Herbrand interpretations, is fundamentally equivalent to Kripke-Kleene se-
mantics (Fitting 1985). We will not make any restriction on the class of intended
interpretations, and present our semantics in the most general setting.
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The second principle will allow us to stick to our semantics as ‘the base semantics’,
while still accounting for the well-founded semantics, the stable model semantics,
and the answer-set semantics. This second principle is based on the idea that any of
those semantics ‘force’ some assumptions to be made in some parts of some rules,
resulting in a new logic program whose base semantics is precisely the desired
semantics of the original program. To force some assumptions to be made in some
parts of some rules, we use a particular kind of transformation of a logical formula,
that we now introduce. Consider two formulas, ϕ, of the form
∃x
(
p(x) ∧ q(x)
)
∨ ∃x
(
p(x) ∧ r(x)
)
,
and ψ, of the form
∃x
(
p(x) ∧ q(x)
)
∨ ∃x
(
(p(x) ∨ x
.
= a ∨ x
.
= b) ∧ r(x)
)
where
.
= represents identity (denotation by the same closed term of two individuals).
Then we can read ψ as “ϕ, where the second occurrence of p(x) is assumed to be
true in case x is either a or b.” Or to put it another way, if in ϕ, we hypothesise
that p(a) and p(b) are true in the context given by the second occurrence of p(x)
in ϕ, then we get (a logical representation equivalent to) ψ. More generally, we
will formalise the notion of ‘transforming a formula into another by making some
contextual hypotheses in the former’, similar to the way ϕ can be transformed
into ψ by making the hypotheses p(a) and p(b) in the context given by the second
occurrence of p(x) in ϕ.
Having this notion of ‘contextual hypothesis’ and associated formula transforma-
tion in hand, our ‘classical’ approach to logic programming will replace the question
of “what should be acknowledged to fail to be derived from a logic program?”—the
question at the heart of the well known semantics in the ‘nonclassical’ approaches
to logic programming—by the question of “what contextual hypotheses should be
made in the bodies of the rules of a logic program?” This will allow us to revisit the
main semantics that have been proposed and view them as particular members of
families of semantics, and more particularly, as those members that are ‘maximally
biased’ towards negative information. For an illustration, consider a vocabulary
with a constant 0, a unary function symbol s and a unary predicate symbol p, and
the logic program P consisting of the following rule.
p(X)← p(s(s(X)))
Given a natural number n, write n for the term obtained from 0 by n applications
of s. Applied to P , the well-founded semantics makes all of p(n), n ∈ N, false in its
intended model of P , based on the principle that when a logic program presents an
infinite descending chain of atoms, all members of that chain should be set to false.
It turns out that this is a particular case of a more general principle, that will be
formalised in the body of the paper, consistent with a large number of models of
P , including in particular
• structures in which p(n) is false for all n’s;
• structures in which p(n) is true for all n’s;
• structures in which p(n) is false for all even n’s, but true for all odd n’s;
Contextual hypotheses and logic programming 9
• structures in which p(n) is true for all even n’s, but false for all odd n’s.
So this more general principle isolates a number of Herbrand models one of which
is maximally biased towards negative information, that happens to be the intended
model advocated by the well-founded semantics; but this more general principle can
be instantiated to ‘cousin semantics’ of the well-founded semantics, some of which
could be of interest. One could be maximally biased towards positive information—a
form of dual well-founded semantics—, or one could try and keep a balance between
positive and negative information.
2.2 A mechanistic view on rules
The rules that make up a logic program are expressions of the form
head ← body
that are read in many possible ways. One can view ← as a link between cause
and effect and conceive of body as a statement that if activated, allows the rule
to fire and head to be generated ; when formally defined, this amounts to a kind
of operational semantics. Or one can view ← as a link between antecedent and
consequent and conceive of body as a statement that if true, allows the rule to
be logically applicable and head to be established as true; when formally defined,
this amounts to a denotational semantics. A legitimate aim is to propose both an
operational and a denotational semantics, and make sure that they match. In this
paper, we propose an operational semantics as it is the shortest path to casting
Kripke-Kleene semantics, the well-founded semantics, the stable model semantics,
and the answer-set semantics into our framework. We also have a denotational
semantics but will make it the subject of another paper.
Let us specify a bit more the syntactic structure of rules and the process by which
they fire. Recall that a formula is in negation normal form if negation is applied to
atomic formulas only; so formulas in negation normal form are built from literals
(atomic formulas and their negations) using disjunction, conjunction, existential
quantification, and universal quantification. Assume that every rule head ← body
of a logic program is such that head is a literal and body is a formula in negation
normal form. Firing rules causes literals—the heads of the rules that fire—to be
generated. Literals can be combined into formulas in negation normal form some of
which can, thanks to the generated literals, be inferred. We impose that inferring
formulas in negation normal form be a constructive process; so p∨¬p can be inferred
provided that p or ¬p has been generated, and ∃x p(x) can be inferred provided
that p(t) has been generated for at least one closed term t.
Having literals as heads of the rules of a logic program is natural in relation to
the answer-set semantics. We will see that it is also natural in relation to Kripke-
Kleene, the well-founded and the stable model semantics, thanks to the notions of
duality of a formula and of symmetry of a logic program, that we now introduce.
Given a formula ϕ in negation normal form, define the dual of ϕ as the formula
∼ϕ obtained from ϕ by changing disjunction into conjunction, conjunction into
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disjunction, existential quantification into universal quantification, universal quan-
tification into existential quantification, by negating nonnegated atomic formulas
and deleting all negation signs (before atomic formulas). For instance, if ϕ is
(p(X) ∨ ¬q(X)) ∧ (¬p(X) ∨ r(X))
then the dual ∼ϕ of ϕ is
(¬p(X) ∧ q(X)) ∨ (p(X) ∧ ¬r(X)).
Now say that a logic program P is symmetric if the bodies of all rules are formulas in
negation normal form and if for all n ∈ N and n-ary predicate symbols ℘, P contains
exactly two rules of respective form ℘(v1, . . . , vn)← ϕ+℘ and ¬℘(v1, . . . , vn) ← ϕ
−
℘
that are dual of each other in the sense that ϕ−℘ and ϕ
+
℘ are dual of each other.
With these notions in hand, we will be able to view Kripke-Kleene semantics, the
well-founded semantics and the stable model semantics as applied to symmetric
logic programs. The working hypothesis is that all three semantics do deal with
symmetric logic programs even though traditionally, many rules can have a head
built from a given predicate symbol and only the positive rules are explicitly given,
with the negative rules being implicit; this is legitimate as first, negation normal
form is not restrictive, second, a straightforward syntactic transformation allows
one to merge all rules whose heads are built from a given predicate symbol, and
third, every negative rule is perfectly determined by its dual positive rule.
It seems natural to allow rules to fire finitely often only, as this immediately
suggests obvious implementations. But we can think theoretically and assume that
rules are allowed to fire transfinitely many times—and all fixed point semantics
happily go for it (Emden and Kowalski 1976; Denecker et al. 2001). So after all
rules have fired any finite number of times, they could fire for the ω-th time, and
then for the (ω + 1)-st time, and then for the (ω + 2)-nd time. . . and then for the
(ω × 2)-nd time, etc. For instance, if every literal of the form p(n), n ∈ N, has
been generated at stage 5n, and if all individuals in the domains of all possible
interpretations are denoted by a term of the form n, then ∀x p(x) can be inferred
at stage ω, a point from which any rule whose body is ∀x p(x) can fire. Formalising
the process by which rules fire transfinitely often determines the set of literals
[P ] generated by a set P of (positive and negative) rules. It is an operational
semantics, previously referred to as the base semantics of P . No other semantics
will be proposed: what is presented as an alternative semantics of P will be viewed
as the base semantics of a program obtained from P in a particular way, that
captures the essence of the alternative semantics and is an instance of a generic
class of transformations.
2.3 Making contextual hypotheses
Let us describe a bit more precisely the relationships between the base semantics
and the well-founded semantics, the stable model semantics and the answer-set
semantics. Consider a set E of literals. Also consider a function Ω, defined on the
set of bodies of the rules in P , that returns, for the body ϕ of each rule in P , a
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selected set of occurrences of literals in ϕ. We can represent this function graphically
using check marks, writing for instance(
p(X) ∨ q(X)
X
)
∧
(
p(X)
X
∨ r(X)
)
to indicate that the selected occurrences of literals in the formula ϕ defined as(
p(X) ∨ q(X)
)
∧
(
p(X) ∨ r(X)
)
are the unique occurrence of q(X) and the second occurrence of p(X). Now with E
and Ω in hand, we define from P a new set of rules, denoted P+ΩE, that formalises
the intuitive request: “in the bodies of the rules of P , use E as a set of hypotheses
in the contexts indicated by Ω.” For instance, if P contains the rule R defined as
p(X)←
(
p(X) ∨ q(X)
)
∧
(
p(X) ∨ r(X)
)
,
if E is defined as {p(2n) | n ∈ N} ∪ {b(n) | n ∈ N}, and if Ω selects the unique
occurrence of q(X) and the second occurrence of p(X) in the body of R then P+ΩE
will contain a rule that is logically equivalent to
p(X)←
(
p(X) ∨ q(X)
)
∧
(
p(X) ∨
∨
n∈N
X
.
= 2n ∨ r(X)
)
where
.
= denotes syntactic identity. We will see that in case P is symmetric, we
can choose Ω and E in such a way that [P +Ω E ] captures the well-founded se-
mantics applied to the positive rules of P ; moreover, this choice of Ω and E is a
particular case of choices made according to a simple principle, that happens to
be maximally biased towards negative information. Still in case P is symmetric,
we can also choose Ω and E in ways such that [P +Ω E ] are the stable models of
the positive rules of P ; similarly, these choices of Ω and E are particular cases of
choices made according to a simple principle, that happen to be maximally biased
towards negative information. Importantly, these correspondences are between a
framework where negation is classical and frameworks where negation is meant not
to be classical. The answer-set semantics seems to offer a greater challenge as its
syntax accommodates two kinds of negation: ¬, meant to be classical, and not ,
meant to be nonclassical. But the correspondence turns out to be easy to estab-
lish if one conceives of not as a syntactic variant to Ω. More precisely, conceive of
not literal as a request to select ∼literal . Given a set of rules P in the bodies of
which both ¬ and not might occur, with not applied only to atoms and classical
negations of atoms, consider the set of rules P ′ obtained from P by replacing all
occurrences of not literal with ∼literal (so only classical negation occurs in P ′).
Then set Ω to select precisely the occurrences of literals in the bodies of the rules
of P ′ that have replaced an occurrence of an expression of the form not literal in
the bodies of the corresponding rules of P . For instance, if P contains the rule
p(X)←
(
not p(X) ∨ q(X)
)
∧
(
¬p(X) ∨ not ¬r(X)
)
,
then P ′ will contain the rule
p(X)←
(
¬p(X) ∨ q(X)
)
∧
(
¬p(X) ∨ r(X)
)
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that Ω will mark as
p(X)←
(
¬p(X)
X
∨ q(X)
)
∧
(
¬p(X) ∨ r(X)
X
)
.
It is then easy to choose E in ways such that [P ′ +Ω E ] are the answer-sets for P
(one answer-set for each choice of E).
3 Logical background
N denotes the set of natural numbers and Ord the class of ordinals.
3.1 Syntax
Definition 1
A vocabulary is a nonempty set of (possibly nullary) function symbols and (possi-
bly nullary) predicate symbols none of which is the distinguished binary predicate
symbol
.
= (identity), such that if V contains at least one nonnullary predicate or
function symbol then V contains at least one nullary function symbol.
As usual, a constant refers to a nullary function symbol.2 We will discuss later
the distinction between
.
= and equality (=), which note can be one of the predicate
symbols in a vocabulary. Accepting nullary predicate symbols in vocabularies will
allow us to formalise all notions in a setting that can be either purely propositional,
or purely first-order, or hybrid.
Notation 1
When a vocabulary contains the constant 0 and the unary function symbol s, we
use n to refer to the term obtained from 0 by n applications of s.
Notation 2
We denote by V a vocabulary.
Notation 3
We fix a countably infinite set of (first-order) variables together with a repetition-
free enumeration (vi)i∈N of this set.
By term we mean term over V, built from the function symbols in V and the
members of (vi)i∈N. We say that a term is closed if it contains no variable.
2 Vocabularies that would contain at least one nonnullary predicate or function symbol but no
constant would be degenerate in this setting, and are better ruled out, though they would be
perfectly legitimate in the usual treatment of first-order logic. But see the discussion at the
beginning of Section 4.1 on how full generality is obtained despite the restrictions imposed on
vocabularies.
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Definition 2
The set Lω1ω(V) of (infinitary) formulas (over V) is inductively defined as the
smallest set that satisfies the following conditions.
• All literals—atoms and negated atoms—(over V), namely, all expressions of
the form ℘(t1, . . . , tn) or ¬℘(t1, . . . , tn) where n ∈ N, ℘ is an n-ary predicate
symbol in V, and t1, . . . , tn are terms over V, belong to Lω1ω(V).
• If V contains at least one constant then all identities and distinctions (over
V), namely, all expressions of the form t
.
= t′ or ¬t
.
= t′, the latter being
usually written t 6
.
= t′, where t and t′ are terms over V, belong to Lω1ω(V).
• All expressions of the form
∨
X or
∧
X with X a countable set of formulas
over V, belong to Lω1ω(V).
• All expressions of the form ∃xϕ or ∀xϕ where x is a variable and ϕ is a
formula over V that has x as a free variable, belong to Lω1ω(V).
A few observations about the definition of Lω1ω(V) are in order.
• First, negation is assumed to be applicable to atoms only, which amounts to
imposing a negation normal form, at no loss of generality. This is technically
convenient, and often used in logic programming.
• Second, the application of quantifiers is restricted to formulas that have the
quantified variables as free variables, and identities and distinctions are ruled
out in case V contains no constant, again at no loss of generality. This is
to embed the propositional framework neatly in a first-order setting: if V
consists of (nullary) predicate symbols only then Lω1ω(V) is the infinitary
propositional language built on V.
• Third, if we wanted to sometimes restrict some concepts to finite formulas,
then we would still be happy with disjunction and conjunction defined as
unary operators on finite sets of formulas. This treatment of disjunction and
conjunction, which contrasts with the traditional view of binary operators
on pairs of formulas, does more than let Lω1ω(V) naturally extend the set of
finite first-order formulas over V. It also simplifies the formal developments. In
particular, there is no need to introduce two extra symbols true and false,
as is usually done in logic programming, since
∧
∅ is valid and can play the
role of true, and
∨
∅ is invalid and can play the role of false.
• Fourth, we distinguish between identity and equality. Identity is treated as
a logical symbol, and its interpretation built into the logic, whereas equality
is treated as a nonlogical symbol (a possible member of V), whose intended
interpretation needs to be explicitly provided. This will be discussed at greater
length in Section 4.1.
Let us emphasise that our framework does not need the power of infinitary lan-
guages. Readers interested only in finite logic programs can ignore the qualifier
“infinitary” and replace Lω1ω(V) by Lωω(V). But Lω1ω(V) offers an elegant way to
work with logic programs consisting of infinitely many rules built from a vocabu-
lary with a finite number of predicate symbols, possibly obtained by grounding a
finite logic program expressed in a first-order language whose set of closed terms
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is infinite, without making any of the formal notions and proofs more complicated
than their finitary counterparts.
Let a formula ϕ be given. We let fv(ϕ) denote the set of free variables of ϕ. If
fv(ϕ) = ∅ then ϕ is said to be closed. Let e be a formula or a term. Given n ∈ N, dis-
tinct variables x1, . . . , xn and closed terms t1, . . . , tn, we write e[t1/x1, . . . , tn/xn]
for the result of substituting simultaneously in e all free occurrences of x1, . . . , xn
by t1, . . . , tn, respectively. Let e and e′ be two formulas or terms. We say that e′
is a closed instance of e iff there exists n ∈ N, distinct variables x1, . . . , xn and
closed terms t1, . . . , tn such that x1, . . . , xn are the variables that occur free in e
and e′ is e[t1/x1, . . . , tn/xn]; if e′ is known to be closed then we say “instance of e”
rather than “closed instance of e.” Given n ∈ N and terms t1, t′1, . . . , tn, t
′
n, we say
that (t′1, . . . , t
′
n) is a closed instance of (t1, . . . , tn) iff for all members i of {1, . . . , n},
t′i is a closed instance of ti; when t
′
1, . . . , t
′
n are known to be closed then we say
“instance of (t1, . . . , tn)” rather than “closed instance of (t1, . . . , tn).”
Though negation can be applied only to atoms and identities, we need to be
able to semantically negate a formula in a syntactically friendly manner which is
achieved in the following usual way: given a formula ϕ, ∼ϕ denotes
• ¬ϕ if ϕ is an atom;
• ψ if ϕ is of the form ¬ψ;
• t 6
.
= t′ if ϕ is of the form t
.
= t′;
• t
.
= t′ if ϕ is of the form t 6
.
= t′;
•
∧
{∼ψ | ψ ∈ X} if ϕ is of the form
∨
X ;
•
∨
{∼ψ | ψ ∈ X} if ϕ is of the form
∧
X ;
• ∀x∼ψ if ϕ is of the form ∃xψ;
• ∃x∼ψ if ϕ is of the form ∀xψ.
Given a set X of formulas, we let ∼X denote {∼ϕ | ϕ ∈ X}. A set X of literals
is said to be consistent just in case there is no closed atom ϕ that is an instance of
both a member of X and a member of ∼X . A set of literals is said to be inconsistent
iff it is not consistent. A set X of literals is said to be saturated just in case every
closed atom is an instance of a member of at least one of the sets X and ∼X . A
set of literals is said to be complete just in case it is saturated and consistent.
Given n ∈ N and formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, we use ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕn and ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn
as abbreviations for
∨
{ϕi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and
∧
{ϕi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, respectively.
Also, given two formulas ϕ1 and ϕ2, ϕ1 → ϕ2 is an abbreviation for ∼ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2
and ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2 is an abbreviation for (ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ2 → ϕ1). Note that → is a
logical symbol whereas ← is not: ← has been used before and will be used later to
represent rules in the traditional way, separating the head of a rule from its body.
In the operational semantics that is the subject of this paper, ← is not meant to
be interpreted as logical implication.
The subformulas of a formula ϕ of the form
∨
X or
∧
X are ϕ and the subformulas
of the members of X . The subformulas of a formula ϕ of the form ∃xψ or ∀xψ are
ϕ and the subformulas of ψ. The subformulas of a formula of the form ¬ψ are ¬ψ
and ψ. An atom or identity is its unique subformula.
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Let a formula ϕ be given. Let T be the parse tree of ϕ where the nodes are labeled
with one of
∨
,
∧
, ∃x for some variable x, or ∀x for some variable x, so that the
leaves of T are all (intuitive) occurrences of literals, identities and distinctions in ϕ.
Then a (formal) occurrence of a literal in ϕ can be defined as the set of all formulas
that appear on the branch of T whose leaf is that (intuitive) occurrence of literal.
Definition 3
Given a formula ϕ and a literal ψ, an occurrence of ψ in ϕ is defined as a set O of
formulas that contains both ϕ and ψ and such that:
• all members of O are subformulas of ϕ;
• ψ is a subformula of all members of O;
• for all members ψ1 and ψ2 of O, either ψ1 is a subformula of ψ2 or ψ2 is a
subformula of ψ1;
• for all members of O of the form
∨
X or
∧
X , O contains a member of X ;
• for all members of O of the form ∃x ξ or ∀x ξ, O contains ξ.
Example 1
Suppose that V contains 3 nullary predicate symbols p, q and r. Let ϕ denote∧{
¬p,
∨
{q, r, ¬p}
}
. The occurrences of literals in ϕ are:
• {ϕ, ¬p}—an occurrence of ¬p in ϕ;
•
{
ϕ,
∨
{q, r, ¬p}, q
}
—an occurrence of q in ϕ;
•
{
ϕ,
∨
{q, r, ¬p}, r
}
—an occurrence of r in ϕ;
•
{
ϕ,
∨
{q, r, ¬p}, ¬p
}
—an occurrence of ¬p in ϕ.
3.2 Semantics
Definition 4
Let a set S of literals be given.
For all formulas ϕ, we inductively define the notion S forces ϕ, denoted Sϕ, as
follows. If S is inconsistent then S forces all formulas. Assume that S is consistent.
• For all formulas ϕ, S  ϕ iff S forces all closed instances of ϕ.
• For all closed terms t1 and t2, S  t1
.
= t2 in case t1 and t2 are identical, and
S  t1 6
.
= t2 in case t1 and t2 are distinct.
• For all closed literals ϕ, S  ϕ iff ϕ is an instance of a member of S.
• For all countable sets X of closed formulas, S
∨
X iff S forces some member
of X , and S 
∧
X iff S forces all members of X .
• For all formulas ϕ and variables x with fv(ϕ) = {x}, S  ∃xϕ iff S  ϕ[t/x]
for some closed term t, and S  ∀xϕ iff S  ϕ[t/x] for all closed terms t.
Given a set T of formulas, we say that S forces T , denoted S  T , just in case S
forces all members of T .
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Definition 5
A standard structure (over V) is a set of closed atoms.
Note the following particular cases.
• If V contains no nullary predicate symbol then a standard structure over V is
basically a Herbrand interpretation.
• If V contains (nullary) predicate symbols only then a standard structure is
basically a propositional interpretation.
The following is the usual notion of truth of a formula in a structure, concisely
expressed in terms of the notion introduced in Definition 4, which of course is meant
to serve other purposes.
Definition 6
Let a standard structure M be given. Let X be the complete set of closed literals
such that for all closed atoms ϕ, ϕ ∈ X iff ϕ ∈M. For all formulas ϕ, we say that
ϕ is true in M, or that M is a model of ϕ, iff X  ϕ.
Notation 4
Let a standard structure M be given. Given a formula ϕ, we write M  ϕ if M is
a model of ϕ, and M 6 ϕ otherwise. Given a set T of formulas, we write M  T if
M is a model of all members of T , and M 6 T otherwise.
Notation 5
We denote by W the set of all standard structures (over V).
Given a set T of formulas and a formula ϕ, we write T W ϕ if every standard
model of T is a model of ϕ; if T W ϕ then we say that T logically implies ϕ in W
or that ϕ is a logical consequence of T in W. The same notation and terminology
also applies to sets of formulas. Two formulas ϕ and ψ are said to be logically
equivalent in W iff they have the same models in W.
4 Formal logic programs and their denotational semantics
4.1 Formal logic programs
The concepts introduced in the previous section might suggest that we are con-
sidering a notion of logical consequence, namely W, that, because of its focus on
standard structures, is stronger than the classical notion of logical consequence. To
make sure that this is not necessarily the case and achieve full generality, we distin-
guish between two kinds of vocabularies, namely, a vocabulary meant to describe
a structure and a vocabulary meant to talk about a structure. The vocabulary V
introduced in Notation 2 is of the first kind; it is meant to express what a structure
is ‘made of’, but it might not be the vocabulary used to talk about a structure,
to express properties of a structure. We assume that the vocabulary used to talk
about a structure is no more expressive, and is possibly less expressive, than the
vocabulary used to describe a structure.
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Notation 6
We denote by V⋆ a (possibly finite) countable subset of V.
V
⋆ is the vocabulary to be used when we talk about a structure by writing
down theories, axioms, theorems: all must consist of formulas over V⋆. Suppose
that infinitely many closed terms are not terms over V⋆, either because V contains
infinitely many constants not in V⋆, or because V contains at least one function
symbol of arity one or more that is not in V⋆. Then for all sets T of formulas over V⋆
and for all formulas ϕ over V⋆, T W ϕ iff T  ϕ. In other words, if countably many
closed terms are ‘unspeakable of’ then W, with sets of formulas that can be ‘spoken
out’ on the left hand side and with formulas that can be ‘spoken out’ on the right
hand side, is equivalent to the classical notion of logical consequence (Martin 2006).
This means that by choosing V to be countable and by setting V⋆ to V, one opts
for a semantics based on Herbrand structures, but by setting V⋆ to a strict subset
of V that makes countably many closed terms ‘unspeakable of’, then one opts for
a semantics equivalent to the classical notion of logical consequence defined on the
basis of all structures.
The availability of both V and V⋆ therefore provides a uniform and simple way
to express that a result holds for the classical notion of logical consequence as well
as for the more restricted notion of logical consequence that rules out nonstandard
structures—by not imposing any condition on V⋆ in the statement of that result—,
or to force a result to hold for one notion of logical consequence only—by imposing
the right condition on the relationship between V and V⋆. Restricting in different
ways a given vocabulary offers some advantages over the more traditional approach
of expanding in different ways a given vocabulary, as done in the Henkin proof of
the completeness of first-order logic or in so-called Herbrand semantics of first-order
logic (see for instance (Kaminski and Rey 2002)).
Most of the work done in logic programming is developed on the basis of the
class of Herbrand structures. But there are exceptions, for instance, the semantics
of definite logic programs and queries can be based on either Herbrand structures
or all structures: given a definite logic program T and a definite query Q, Prolog
returns a computed answer substitution θ iff the universal closures of Qθ are true
in all Herbrand models of T , or equivalently, are true in the minimal Herbrand
model of T , or equivalently, are true in all models of T (Lloyd 1987). So it is
sometimes desirable not to be tied to a semantics based on Herbrand structures.
Moreover, we will see that such a restriction is not conceptually necessary in the
sense that all notions defined in this paper will not require any prior assumption on
the relationship between V⋆ and V; but we will sometimes have to suppose that V⋆
is equal to V in the statements of some results. So we are going to define a notion
of logic program as a set of rules built from V⋆, not from V.
Notation 7
We denote by Prd(V⋆) the set of predicate symbols in V⋆. For all n ∈ N, we denote
by Prd(V⋆, n) the set of members of Prd(V⋆) of arity n.
We want to consider sets of rules whose heads are literals and whose bodies are
arbitrary. Since formulas can be infinitary and can contain occurrences of
.
=, and
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since
∨
∅ is a formula that can be used as the body of a rule such as q ←
∨
∅ to
express that q is neither a fact nor the head of a rule that can be activated, it is
enough to provide, for every n ∈ N and ℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆, n), two rules: one whose head is
℘(v1, . . . , vn) (which is nothing but ℘ if n = 0), and one whose head is ¬℘(v1, . . . , vn)
(which is nothing but ¬℘ if n = 0). For instance, {p1(2n) ← p2(2n+ 1) | n ∈ N}
can be represented as p1(v1)←
∨{
p2(s(v1)) ∧ v1
.
= 2n
∣∣ n ∈ N}.
For the purpose of providing, for every ℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆), the positive and negative
rules associated with ℘, and for the purpose of making some definitions more com-
pact, we introduce the following notation (in which + and − could be replaced by
1 and 0, but using + and − will be easier to read).
Notation 8
We let I(V⋆) denote Prd(V⋆)× {+,−}.
Given n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆, n) and terms t1, . . . , tn, we also write ℘(t1, . . . , tn) as
℘+(t1, . . . , tn) and ¬℘(t1, . . . , tn) as ℘−(t1, . . . , tn).
Definition 7
We define a formal logic program (over V⋆) as an I(V⋆)-family of formulas over
V
⋆, say (ϕǫ℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆), such that for all n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V
⋆, n) and ǫ ∈ {+,−},
fv(ϕǫ℘) ⊆ {v1, . . . , vn}.
Since there is no restriction on the use of quantifiers in the body of a rule, the
condition on variables is at no loss of generality and is imposed so as to simplify
subsequent notation, and is also often used in the literature; it just states that a
variable that occurs free in the body of a rule occurs in the head of that rule. Note
that if the set of predicate symbols in V⋆ is finite then finite sets of finite rules over
V
⋆ are naturally translated into finite formal logic programs.
Example 2
Suppose that V⋆ consists of a constant 0, a unary function symbol s, 5 nullary pred-
icate symbols q1, . . . , q5, and 4 unary predicate symbols p1, . . . , p4. The following
formulas provide an example of a formal logic program.
ϕ+p1 ≡ v1
.
= 0 ∨ ∃v0
(
v1
.
= s(s(v0)) ∧ p1(v0)
)
ϕ−p1 ≡ v1 6
.
= 0 ∧ ∀v0
(
v1 6
.
= s(s(v0)) ∨ ¬p1(v0)
)
ϕ+p2 ≡ v1
.
= 0 ∨ ∃v0
(
v1
.
= s(s(v0)) ∧ p2(v0)
)
ϕ−p2 ≡ v1
.
= s(0) ∨ ∃v0
(
v1
.
= s(s(v0)) ∧ ¬p2(v0)
)
ϕ+p3 ≡ v1
.
= 0 ∨ ∃v0
(
v1
.
= s(v0) ∧ ¬p3(v0)
)
ϕ−p3 ≡ ∃v1
(
v1
.
= s(v0) ∧ p3(v0)
)
ϕ+p4 ≡ p4(s(s(v1))) ϕ
+
q1
≡
∧
∅ ϕ+q2 ≡ q3
ϕ−p4 ≡ ¬p4(s(s(v1))) ϕ
−
q1
≡
∨
∅ ϕ−q2 ≡ ¬q3
ϕ+q3 ≡ q2 ϕ
+
q4
≡ q4 ϕ
+
q5
≡ ¬q5
ϕ−q3 ≡ ¬q2 ϕ
−
q4
≡
∨
∅ ϕ−q5 ≡
∨
∅
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As V⋆ contains both nullary and nonnullary predicate symbols, Example 2 de-
scribes a ‘hybrid’ formal logic program, but of a simple kind as it consists of a
purely first-order part and a purely propositional part. Let us take advantage of
this example to illustrate how Definition 7 is put to use to represent rules. Recall
that
∧
∅ is valid and
∨
∅ is invalid. For the propositional rules,
• ϕ+q1 and ϕ
−
q1
represent the fact q1,
• ϕ+q2 and ϕ
−
q2
represent the rules q2 ← q3 and ¬q2 ← ¬q3,
• ϕ+q3 and ϕ
−
q3
represent the rules q3 ← q2 and ¬q3 ← ¬q2,
• ϕ+q4 and ϕ
−
q4
represent the rule q4 ← q4, and
• ϕ+q5 and ϕ
−
q5
represent the rule q5 ← ¬q5.
Now to the first-order rules.
• The formulas ϕ+pi , i ∈ {1, 2}, represent the rule
pi(v1)← v1
.
= 0 ∨ ∃v0
(
v1
.
= s(s(v0)) ∧ pi(v0)
)
which could be rewritten as the following fact and rule.
pi(0)
pi(s(s(v1)))← pi(v1)
So for i ∈ {1, 2}, ϕ+pi allows one to generate all literals of the form pi(2n),
n ∈ N. It is easily verified that for i ∈ {1, 2}, ϕ−pi allows one to generate all
literals of the form ¬pi(2n+ 1), n ∈ N. More precisely, the rule represented
by ϕ−p1 , namely
¬p1(v1)← v1 6
.
= 0 ∧ ∀v0
(
v1 6
.
= s(s(v0)) ∨ ¬p1(v0)
)
could be naturally implemented from {p1(0), p1(s(s(v1))) ← p1(v1)} using
negation as finite failure, and its syntax is naturally related to Cark’s com-
pletion of the set {p1(0), p1(s(s(v1)))← p1(v1)}.
• The rule ¬p2(v1)← ϕ−p2 , namely
¬p2(v1)← v1
.
= s(0) ∨ ∃v0
(
v1
.
= s(s(v0)) ∧ ¬p2(v0)
)
is very similar to the rule p2(v1)← ϕ+p2 , and could be rewritten
¬p2(s(0))
¬p2(s(s(v1)))← ¬p2(v1)
to generate {¬p2(2n+ 1) | n ∈ N} similarly to the way {p2(2n) | n ∈ N}
would be generated using p2(v1)← ϕ+p2 .
• The formulas ϕ+p3 and ϕ
−
p3
offer a third way of generating the set of even
numbers and its complement, with both the positive rule p3(v1) ← ϕ+p3 and
the negative rule ¬p3(v1) ← ϕ−p3 being used alternatively, starting with the
positive rule.
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• Finally, ϕ+p4 and ϕ
−
p4
represent the rules
p4(v1)← p4(s(s(v1)))
¬p4(v1)← ¬p4(s(s(v1)))
and would not generate any literal.
The second item in Definition 4 captures the unique name axioms that come
with the definition of Clark’s completion of a logic program. Making
.
= a logical
symbol amounts to building into the logic a notion of identity stronger than the
usual, less restrictive notion of equality, that in our framework is nonlogical and has
to be axiomatised if needed: = is then put into V⋆ and its intended interpretation
captured by any formal logic program (ϕǫ℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆) such that ϕ
+
= is of the form∨
X where X is a superset of{
v1
.
= v2, v2 = v1, ∃v0(v1 = v0 ∧ v0 = v2)
}
∪{
∃v3 . . .∃v3+2n−1
(
v3 = v3+n ∧ · · · ∧ v3+n−1 = v3+2n−1 ∧
v1
.
= f(v3, . . . , v3+n−1) ∧ v2
.
= f(v3+n, . . . , v3+2n−1)
) ∣∣∣
n ∈ N, f is an n-ary function symbol in V⋆
}
,
ϕ−= is of the form
∨
X where X contains
∃v0
(
(v0 = v1 ∧ v0 6= v2) ∨ (v0 6= v1 ∧ v0 = v2)
)
and for all n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆, n) and ǫ ∈ {+,−}, ϕǫ℘ is of the form
∨
X where X
contains
∃vn+1 . . .∃v2n
(
v1 = vn+1 ∧ · · · ∧ vn = v2n ∧ ℘
ǫ(vn+1, . . . , v2n)
)
.
Identity is a key notion in logic programming as it is at the heart of the unification
algorithm, and the usual approach is to treat identity and equality as equivalent,
with the restriction to the class of Herbrand interpretations as a justification for the
identification of both notions. Our approach consists in logically defining identity
from V, the vocabulary used to describe a structure, and in axiomatising equality
from V⋆, the vocabulary used to talk about a structure. As a consequence, equality
and Herbrand structures are not interdependent: if infinitely many closed terms are
‘unspeakable of’ then equality as axiomatised above behaves equivalently to the
way it behaves w.r.t. the classical notion of logical consequence.
Definition 8
Given a formal logic program P = (ϕǫ℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆), the classical logical form of P is
defined as {
ϕǫ℘ → ℘
ǫ(v1, . . . , vn)
∣∣ n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆, n), ǫ ∈ {+,−}}.
Of course, W applied to the classical logical form of a formal logic program
P does not adequately capture the logical meaning of P . An appropriate logical
reading of a formal logic program, which amounts to an appropriate denotational
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semantics, requires more than reading the arrow that links the left hand side and
right hand side of a rule as a logical implication: it requires the explicit use of a
modal operator of necessity to capture the notion of derivability, or provability, in
the style of epistemic logic (Moore 1985; Marek and Truszczyński 1991). We will
complete this task in another paper.
Notation 9
Given a formal logic program P , we let Clf(P) denote the classical logical form of
P .
The general logic programs that are the object of Kripke-Kleene semantics, the
well-founded semantics and the stable model semantics can be seen as a particular
case of formal logic programs where the negative rules are fully determined by the
positive rules and can be left implicit; they are in one-to-one correspondence with
the formal logic programs defined next.
Definition 9
Let a formal logic program P = (ϕǫ℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆) be given. We say that P is symmetric
iff for all ℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆), ϕ−℘ is identical to ∼ϕ
+
℘ .
The next definition introduces a notion that is a key property of symmetric formal
logic programs.
Definition 10
We say that a formal logic program (ϕǫ℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆) is locally consistent iff for all
℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆), no closed instance of ϕ+℘ ∧ ϕ
−
℘ has a model in W.
Property 1
A symmetric formal logic program is locally consistent.
4.2 Generated literals
The mechanistic view on (the rules of) a formal logic program P presented in
Section 2.2 allows one to talk about the literals over V⋆ generated by P ; these
literals make up a set that we denote by [P ]. More precisely, a literal ψ over V⋆ is
generated by P and put into [P ] if it is possible to successively fire rules, starting
with rules whose body can be unconditionally activated (such as
∧
∅), till enough
literals have been generated and put into [P ] so that there exists a rule in P of the
form χ← ξ and a substitution θ such that ψ is χθ and for all closed substitutions
θ′, ξ(θθ′) can be activated thanks to the literals in [P ]; the notation that follows
will allow us to easily refer to a formula (determined by ψ and P) of the form ξθ′′
where θ′′ is θ with some of the variables in its range being possibly renamed so that
none of the variables that occurs in ψ (that is, in χθ) is captured when applying
the substitution θ′′ to ξ.
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Notation 10
Let a formal logic program P be given. For all n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆, n), terms
t1, . . . , tn and ǫ ∈ {+,−}, we let P [℘ǫ(t1, . . . , tn)] denote a formula of the form
ϕǫ℘[t
′
1/v1, . . . , t
′
n/vn] whose closed instances are precisely the formulas of the form
ϕǫ℘[t
′′
1/v1, . . . , t
′′
n/vn] with (t
′′
1 , . . . , t
′′
n) any closed instance of (t1, . . . , tn).
In the context of Notation 10, observe that if none of the variables occurring in one
of t1, . . . , tn is captured by quantifiers in ϕǫ℘ when simultaneously substituting v1,
. . . , vn in ϕǫ℘ by t1, . . . , tn, respectively, then a natural choice for P [℘
ǫ(t1, . . . , tn)]
is ϕǫ℘[t1/v1, . . . , tn/vn] itself. Using Notation 10, one can then concisely define the
set of literals over V⋆ generated by a formal logic program as a fixed point:
Notation 11
Given a formal logic program P , we denote by [P ] the (unique) ⊆-minimal set of
literals over V⋆ that forces P [ψ] for all ψ ∈ [P ].
Of course, we could alternatively define [P ] in terms of a transfinite construction
and collect at some round, indexed by an ordinal, the set of literals over V⋆ that
can be generated from P by activating some instances of the bodies of some of
P ’s rules thanks to the literals generated at previous rounds. This construction is
defined in Notation 12, and the fact that it is an alternative definition to [P ] is
stated as Property 2.
Notation 12
Let a formal logic program P be given. Inductively define a sequence ([P ]α)α∈Ord
of sets of literals over V⋆ as follows. Let an ordinal α be given and assume that for
all β < α, [P ]β has been defined. Then denote by [P ]α the set of all literals ψ over
V
⋆ with
⋃
β<α[P ]β  P [ψ].
Property 2
For all formal logic programs P , [P ] =
⋃
α∈Ord[P ]α.
Example 3
If P is the formal logic program of Example 2 then
[P ] =
{
pi(2n), ¬pi(2n+ 1) | i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, n ∈ N
}
∪ {q1}.
It is easy to verify that the set of literals over V⋆ generated by a formal logic
program is closed under forcing.
Property 3
For all formal logic programs P and literals ψ over V⋆, [P ]  ψ iff ψ ∈ [P ].
Local consistency as introduced in Definition 10 will play a pivotal role in the
statements of some propositions, but the more general notion of plain consistency
given next is a better counterpart to the classical concept of a consistent theory.
Definition 11
A formal logic program P is said to be consistent just in case [P ] is consistent.
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Property 4
Every locally consistent formal logic program is consistent.
Let a formal logic program P = (ϕǫ℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆) be given. When V
⋆ = V, the
definition of [P ] can involve closed literals only—a consequence of Property 3 and
the next property. In the general case, [P ] is a set of possibly nonclosed literals,
and some rules might fire because their bodies are activated thanks to such literals.
For instance, assume that V⋆ contains a unary predicate symbol p and a nullary
predicate symbol q, ϕ+p =
∧
∅, and ϕ+q = ∀v0 p(v0). Then [P ] contains p(v0), hence
it contains q. Also, [P ] contains p(t) for all terms t over V⋆, hence in particular for
all closed terms t over V⋆. Still, if at least one of V’s constants does not belong to
V
⋆, then the set of all closed members of [P ] of the form p(t) (with t a closed term
over V⋆) does not force ∀v0 p(v0), which shows that the next property would not
hold if the assumption V⋆ = V was dropped.
Property 5
Let a formal logic program P be given. If V⋆ = V then the set of closed members
of [P ] is the (unique) ⊆-minimal set X of closed literals with X  {P [ψ] | ψ ∈ X}.
The classical logical form of a formal logic program P , formalised in Definition 8,
does not capture in a satisfactory way the logical meaning of P , but it is still well
behaved, as expressed by the property and the corollary that follow.
Property 6
For all formal logic programs P , Clf(P) W [P ].
Corollary 1
For all formal logic programs P , if [P ] is complete then the set of closed instances
of atoms in [P ] is a model of Clf(P).
4.3 Characterisation of Kripke-Kleene semantics
The characterisation is based on the following definition.
Definition 12
A partial interpretation (over V) is a consistent set of closed literals.
Kripke-Kleene semantics is usually presented in a 3-valued logical setting. The
relationship between Definition 12 and a 3-valued logical setting is the following.
Let M be a partial interpretation, and let a closed atom ϕ be given. Then the
truth value of ϕ in M can be set to true if ϕ ∈ M , to false if ¬ϕ ∈ M , and to
a third value or to ‘undefined’ otherwise. Definition 13 then generalises the notion
of a partial model of a general logic program—that as we have pointed out, can
be seen as a symmetric formal logic program whose negative rules have not been
explicitly written.
24 Éric A. Martin
Definition 13
Let a formal logic program P = (ϕǫ℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆) be given. A partial model of P is a
partial interpretation M such that for all n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆, n), closed terms t1,
. . . , tn and ǫ ∈ {+,−}, M contains ℘ǫ(t1, . . . , tn) iff M forces ϕǫ℘[t1/v1, . . . , tn/vn].
Given a formal logic program P , a ⊆-minimal partial model of P is referred to
more simply as a minimal partial model of P . Proposition 1 expresses that the
generalisation of Kripke-Kleene semantics given in Definition 13 is equivalent to
our base semantics of a consistent formal logic program, provided that V⋆ is equal
to V, which is the underlying assumption of all frameworks where that semantics
is considered. Note that Proposition 1 still applies to more general frameworks as
it deals with formal logic programs that might not be symmetric.
Proposition 1
Assume that V⋆ = V. Let a consistent formal logic program P be given. Then P has
a unique minimal partial model, which is nothing but the set of closed instances of
members of [P ].
Proof
Let X denote the set of partial models of P . It is immediately verified that:
• the set of closed instances of members of [P ] is included in
⋂
X ;
• the set of closed instances of members of [P ] belongs to X .
Hence
⋂
X , being equal to the set of closed instances of members of [P ], is a partial
model of P .
5 Extensors, and relationships to particular semantics
5.1 Extensors
We now formalise the operation, discussed in Section 2.3, of transforming a formal
logic program P into another formal logic program P +Ω E, where Ω selects some
occurrences of literals in the bodies of P ’s rules and E is a set of literals, the
intended meaning of P +Ω E being: “in P , assume E in the contexts indicated
by Ω.” Definition 14 defines the kind of formal object denoted by Ω. Notation 13
specifies three particular cases the first two of which will play a special role in
relation to the stable model and the well-founded semantics. Recall Definition 3 for
the notion of an occurrence of a literal in a formula.
Definition 14
Let a formal logic program P = (ϕǫ℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆) be given. A literal marker for P is
a sequence of the form (Oǫ℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆) where for all ℘ ∈ Prd(V
⋆) and ǫ ∈ {+,−},
Oǫ℘ is a set of occurrences of literals in ϕ
ǫ
℘.
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Notation 13
Let a formal logic program P and a literal marker Ω for P be given. Write P as
(ϕǫ℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆) and Ω as (O
ǫ
℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆).
• If for all ℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆), O+℘ is empty and O
−
℘ is the set of all occurrences of
negated atoms in ϕ−℘ , then we denote Ω by 〈·,−〉P .
• If for all ℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆) and ǫ ∈ {+,−}, Oǫ℘ is the set of all occurrences of
negated atoms in ϕǫ℘, then we denote Ω by 〈−,−〉P .
• If for all ℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆) and ǫ ∈ {+,−}, Oǫ℘ is the set of all occurrences of
literals in ϕǫ℘, then we denote Ω by 〈±,±〉P .
In Section 2.3, we gave the following introductory example. Assume that V⋆
contains the constant 0, the unary function symbol s and three unary predicate
symbols p, q and r. Let P be a formal logic program, say (ϕǫ℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆), such that
ϕ+p is equal to (
p(v1) ∨ q(v1)
)
∧
(
p(v1) ∨ r(v1)
)
.
Let Ω = (Oǫ℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆) be the literal marker for P such that O
+
p is equal to{
{ϕ+p , p(v1) ∨ q(v1), q(v1)}, {ϕ
+
p , p(v1) ∨ r(v1), p(v1)}
}
which corresponds to marking ϕ+p as(
p(v1) ∨ q(v1)
X
)
∧
(
p(v1)
X
∨ r(v1)
)
.
Let E be defined as
{
p(2n) | n ∈ N
}
. Then P +Ω E is a formal logic program,
say (ψǫ℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆), such that ψ
+
p will be defined in such a way that it is logically
equivalent in W to(
p(v1) ∨ q(v1)
)
∧
(
p(v1) ∨
∨
n∈N
v1
.
= 2n ∨ r(v1)
)
.
If we modify the example and assume that E is rather set to {p(s(s(v0)))}, then
ψ+p will be defined in such a way that it is logically equivalent in W to(
p(v1) ∨ q(v1)
)
∧
(
p(v1) ∨ ∃v0
(
v1
.
= s(s(v0))
)
∨ r(v1)
)
.
The eventual definition of P +Ω E for arbitrary choices of P , Ω and E, will be a
straightforward generalisation of those examples. One should keep in mind that E
will eventually be chosen as a set of literals over V⋆ (as opposed to a set of literals
over V), with V and V⋆ being possibly different, which implies that again, we cannot
assume in full generality that E can be restricted to consist of closed literals only.
The notation that follows should be thought of as recording the set of all possible
substitutions thanks to which a given formula ϕ can be shown to subsume some
member of a set E of formulas.
Notation 14
Given a formula ϕ, n ∈ N, distinct variables x1, . . . , xn with fv(ϕ) = {x1, . . . , xn},
and a set E of formulas, we let Unif(ϕ,E) denote the set of all formulas of the form
∃y1 . . . ∃ym(x1
.
= t1 ∧ . . . ∧ xn
.
= tn)
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where t1, . . . , tn are terms over V⋆, m is a member of N, y1, . . . , ym are distinct
variables, all distinct from x1, . . . , xn, {y1, . . . , ym} is the set of variables that occur
in at least one of t1, . . . , tn and for all closed terms t′1, . . . , t
′
n, if (t
′
1, . . . , t
′
n) is an
instance of (t1, . . . , tn) then ϕ[t′1/x1, . . . , t
′
n/xn] is an instance of a member of E.
In the propositional case, n = 0 and Notation 14 simplifies the definition of
Unif(ϕ,E) to {
∧
∅} if ϕ ∈ E, and to ∅ otherwise. The next notation will describe
the operations of strengthening or weakening some occurrences of literals in a for-
mula: given a formula ϕ, a set O of occurrences of literals in ϕ and a set E of
literals,
• ⊙OEϕ will be a formula obtained from ϕ by assuming that every occurrence
of a literal in ϕ that belongs to O is false unless it subsumes some member of
E;
• ⊚OEϕ will be a formula obtained from ϕ by assuming that every occurrence of
a literal in ϕ that belongs to O is true if it subsumes some member of E.
Note that ⊙OEϕ and ⊚
O
Eϕ do not denote two notions that differ only in that one
refers to “false” when the other refers to “true.” This is maybe more easily observed
thanks to the following alternative, but less precise, informal description of ⊙OEϕ
and ⊚OEϕ: an occurrence of a literal in ϕ that belongs to O is true in ⊙
O
Eϕ iff it
subsumes some member of E, whereas an occurrence of a literal in ϕ that belongs
to O is true in ⊚OEϕ iff it subsumes a member of E or if it can be shown to be true.
The first operation prepares the technical definition of a formal logic program
obtained from P and E, and denoted P |Ω E, that will be useful for formalising
in our setting the answer-set and the stable model semantics. The second opera-
tion prepares the definition of P +Ω E. Hence to develop our framework, only the
notation ⊚OEϕ is needed: the notation ⊙
O
Eϕ is used only to reformulate the usual
definitions of the answer-set and the stable model semantics in a way that will make
it easier to establish their relationship to our setting. To relate our framework to
the stable model semantics, Ω will be set to 〈−,−〉P , and to relate it to the well-
founded semantics, Ω will be set to either 〈−,−〉P or 〈·,−〉P (both options are equally
suitable), which prompts for a special notation, that of Notation 16. Both P |Ω E
and P +Ω E are formally defined in Notation 17.
Notation 15
Let E be a set of literals. We inductively define for all formulas ϕ and sets O of
occurrences of literals in ϕ two formulas ⊙OEϕ and ⊚
O
Eϕ. Let ϕ ∈ Lω1ω(V) and a
set O of occurrences of literals in ϕ be given.
• Suppose that ϕ is an identity, a distinction or a literal.
— If O = ∅ then both ⊙OEϕ and ⊚
O
Eϕ are ϕ.
— If O =
{
{ϕ}
}
then ⊙OEϕ is
∨
Unif(ϕ,E) and ⊚OEϕ is
∨
{ϕ}∪Unif(ϕ,E).
• Suppose that ϕ is of the form
∨
X or
∧
X . For all ψ ∈ X , let Oψ be the
(unique) set of occurrences of literals in ψ, say o, with o ∪ {ϕ} ∈ O.
— If ϕ is the formula
∨
X then ⊙OEϕ is
∨
{⊙
Oψ
E ψ | ψ ∈ X} and ⊚
O
Eϕ is∨
{⊚
Oψ
E ψ | ψ ∈ X}.
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— If ϕ is the formula
∧
X then ⊙OEϕ is
∧
{⊙
Oψ
E ψ | ψ ∈ X} and ⊚
O
Eϕ is∧
{⊚
Oψ
E ψ | ψ ∈ X}.
• Suppose that ϕ is of the form ∃xψ or ∀xψ. Let Oψ be the (unique) set of
occurrences of literals in ψ, say o, with o ∪ {ϕ} ∈ O.
— If ϕ is the formula ∃xψ then ⊙OEϕ and ⊚
O
Eϕ are the existential closure
of ⊙OψE ψ and ∃x⊚
Oψ
E ψ, respectively.
3
— If ϕ is the formula ∀xψ then ⊙OEϕ and ⊚
O
Eϕ are the universal closure
of ⊙OψE ψ and ∀x⊚
Oψ
E ψ, respectively.
4
Notation 16
Given ϕ ∈ Lω1ω(V) and a set E of literals, and letting O be the set of occurrences
of negated atoms in ϕ, we write ⊙−Eϕ for ⊙
O
Eϕ and ⊚
−
Eϕ for ⊚
O
Eϕ.
Example 4
Suppose that P is the formal logic program of Example 2 and
E = {p3(2), p3(3), ¬p3(1), ¬p3(2), p4(2), ¬p4(1), ¬q5}.
• As Unif(¬p3(v0), E) is {v0
.
= 1, v0
.
= 2}, ⊙−Eϕ
+
p3
and ⊚−Eϕ
+
p3
are
v1
.
= 0 ∨ ∃v0
(
v1
.
= s(v0) ∧ (v0
.
= 1 ∨ v0
.
= 2)
)
,
and
v1
.
= 0 ∨ ∃v0
(
v1
.
= s(v0) ∧ (¬p3(v0) ∨ v0
.
= 1 ∨ v0
.
= 2)
)
,
which are logically equivalent in W to
v1
.
= 0 ∨ v1
.
= 2 ∨ v1
.
= 3
and
v1
.
= 0 ∨ v1
.
= 2 ∨ v1
.
= 3 ∨ ∃v0
(
v1
.
= s(v0) ∧ ¬p3(v0)
)
,
respectively.
• As ϕ+p4 does not contain any occurrence of a negated atom, ⊙
−
Eϕ
+
p4
and ⊚−Eϕ
+
p4
are both identical to ϕ+p4 .
• As ¬p4(s(s(v1))) does not unify with ¬p4(1) and ¬q3 does not belong to E,
⊙−Eϕ
−
p4
and ⊙−Eϕ
−
q2
are both identical to
∨
∅, while ⊚−Eϕ
−
p4
and ⊚−Eϕ
−
q2
are
logically equivalent in W to ϕ−p4 and ϕ
−
q2
, respectively.
• As ¬q5 belongs to E, Unif(¬q5, E) is {
∧
∅}, and ⊙−Eϕ
+
q5
and ⊚−Eϕ
+
q5
are both
logically equivalent in W to
∧
∅.
3 We cannot write ∃x⊙
Oψ
E
ψ as x might not occur free in ⊙
Oψ
E
ψ.
4 Similarly, we cannot write ∀x⊙
Oψ
E
ψ as x might not occur free in ⊙
Oψ
E
ψ.
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Notation 17
Let a formal logic program P and a literal marker Ω for P be given. Write P as
(ϕǫ℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆) and Ω as (O
ǫ
℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆). Let a set E of literals be given.
• We let P |Ω E denote (⊙
Oǫ℘
E ϕ
ǫ
℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆).
• We let P +Ω E denote (⊚
Oǫ℘
E ϕ
ǫ
℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆).
Property 7
For all formal logic programs P , literal markers Ω for P and sets E of literals,
[P ] ⊆ [P +Ω E ].
The next property will be applied in the particular case where one of E and F
denotes a set of literals over V⋆, and the other the set of its closed instances.
Property 8
Let a formal logic program P , a literal marker Ω for P , and two sets E and F of
literals be such that E and F have the same closed instances. Then [P |Ω E ] is
equal to [P |Ω F ] and [P +Ω E ] is equal to [P +Ω F ].
The next lemma will play a crucial role in relating our framework to the answer-
set and the stable model semantics.
Lemma 1
Let a formal logic program P , a literal marker Ω for P , and a set E of literals
be given. Then [P |Ω E ] ⊆ [P +Ω E ]. Also, if all closed instances of members of
[P |Ω E ] are instances of members of E then [P +Ω E ] = [P |Ω E ].
Proof
Write Ω = (Oǫ℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆).
Let us verify the first part of the lemma. By Property 2, it suffices to show that
for all ordinals α, [P |Ω E ]α is a subset of [P +Ω E ]α. Proof is by induction. Let
an ordinal α be given, and assume that for all β < α, [P |Ω E ]β ⊆ [P +Ω E ]β .
Let n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆, n), terms t1, . . . , tn over V⋆ and ǫ ∈ {+,−} be such that
℘ǫ(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ [P |Ω E ]α. Then
⋃
β<α[P |Ω E ]β  ⊙
Oǫ℘
E P
[
℘ǫ[t1/v1, . . . , tn/vn]
]
.
Moreover, it is immediately verified that
{
⊙
Oǫ℘
E P
[
℘ǫ[t1/v1, . . . , tn/vn]
]}
logically
implies ⊚
Oǫ℘
E P
[
℘ǫ[t1/v1, . . . , tn/vn]
]
in W. This together with the inductive hy-
pothesis implies that
⋃
β<α[P +Ω E ]β forces ⊚
Oǫ℘
E P
[
℘ǫ[t1/v1, . . . , tn/vn]
]
; hence
℘ǫ(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ [P +Ω E ]α, completing the verification that [P |Ω E ] ⊆ [P +Ω E ].
Assume that all closed instances of members of [P |ΩE ] are instances of members
of E. Suppose for a contradiction that [P +Ω E ] * [P |Ω E ]. By Property 2, let
ordinal α be least with [P +Ω E ]α * [P |Ω E ]. Let n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆, n),
terms t1, . . . , tn over V⋆ and ǫ ∈ {+,−} be such that ℘ǫ(t1, . . . , tn) belongs to
[P +Ω E ]α \ [P |Ω E ]. Then
⋃
β<α[P +Ω E ]β ⊚
Oǫ℘
E P
[
℘ǫ[t1/v1, . . . , tn/vn]
]
; so by
the choice of α, [P |Ω E ]  ⊚
Oǫ℘
E P
[
℘ǫ[t1/v1, . . . , tn/vn]
]
, which together with the
assumption on E, easily implies that [P |Ω E ] forces ⊙
Oǫ℘
E P
[
℘ǫ[t1/v1, . . . , tn/vn]
]
.
Hence ℘ǫ(t1, . . . , tn) belongs to [P |Ω E ]; contradiction.
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The transformation of a formal logic program P into a formal logic program of
the form P +Ω E will be of interest only in case Ω and E are chosen in such a way
that the condition in the definition that follows holds.
Definition 15
Let a formal logic program P and a literal marker Ω for P be given. We call an
extensor for (P , Ω) any set E of literals over V⋆ such that E∪[P+ΩE ] is consistent.
Before we can end this section, we need one more technical notation. In relation
to the well-founded semantics, it will be convenient to introduce an intermediate
construction involving a family of extensors: a formal logic program P will be
extended to a formal logic program of the form P+ΩE0, and then to a formal logic
program of the form (P +Ω E0) +Ω1 E1, and then to a formal logic program of the
form (P +Ω E0 ∪ E1) +Ω2 E2, etc. Now Ω1, Ω2, etc., will not be arbitrary: they
will all select occurrences of literals in P +Ω E0, P +Ω E0 ∪E1, etc., determined by
Ω, even though these occurrences of literals are taken from different formal logic
programs as P is being successively transformed. For instance, in Example 4, the
occurrence of ¬p3(v0) in ϕ+p3 can be ‘tracked down’ in ⊚
−
Eϕ
+
p3
, though the (unique)
occurrence of ¬p3(v0) in ϕ+p3 is of course different to the (unique) occurrence of
¬p3(v0) in ⊚
−
Eϕ
+
p3
. The following notation will allow us to formally express Ω1, Ω2,
etc., from Ω and E0, E1, etc., and write Ω+ E0 for Ω1, Ω + E0 ∪ E1 for Ω2, etc.
Notation 18
For all formulas ϕ, sets O of occurrences of literals in ϕ and nonsingleton members
o of O, let ρ(O, o) be the set of occurrences o′ of literals in the formula in which
o \ {ϕ} is an occurrence of a literal, and such that o′ ∪{ϕ} ∈ O. Given a formula ϕ,
a set O of occurrences of literals in ϕ, a set E of literals and a member o of O, set
⊚
O
Eo =
{
{⊚OEϕ} ∪⊚
ρ(O, o)
E o \{ϕ} if ϕ is not a literal,
{⊚OEϕ, ϕ} otherwise.
Notation 19
Let a formal logic program P , a literal marker Ω for P and a set E of literals be
given. Write Ω = (Oǫ℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆). We let Ω+ E denote(
{⊚
Oǫ℘
E o | o ∈ O
ǫ
℘}
)
(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆)
.
The property that follows justifies why the construction described before Nota-
tion 18 refers to a formal logic program of the form (P +Ω E0 ∪E1) +Ω2 E2 rather
than to a formal logic program of the form
(
(P +Ω E0) +Ω1 E1
)
+Ω2 E2.
Property 9
Let a formal logic program P , a literal marker Ω for P , and two sets E and F of
literals be given. Then [P +Ω E ∪ F ] = [ (P +Ω E) +Ω+E F ].
5.2 Special extensors
The task of casting the well-founded, the stable model and the answer-set semantics
into our framework boils down to defining appropriate literal markers and extensors.
30 Éric A. Martin
At a fundamental level, the question “what are legitimate contextual assumptions?”
replaces the question “how does negation behave?” We now define the key properties
that literal markers and extensors can enjoy and allow one to complete that task.
Definition 16
Let a formal logic program P , a literal marker Ω for P , and an extensor E for
(P , Ω) be given.
• We say that E is imperative iff for all closed literals ϕ,
ϕ is not an instance of a member of E iff [P +Ω E ] ∼ϕ.
• We say that E is implicative iff E ⊆ [P +Ω E ].
• We say that E is supporting iff for all ψ ∈ E, [P ]  (P +Ω E)[ψ].
• Given an ordinal α, we say that E is α-foundational iff there exists a sequence
(Eβ)β<α of sets of literals such that E =
⋃
β<αEβ and for all ordinals β < α,
Eβ is a supporting extensor for (P +Ω
⋃
γ<β Eγ , Ω+
⋃
γ<β Eγ).
• We say that E is foundational iff there exists a sequence (Eα)α∈Ord of sets
of literals such that E =
⋃
α∈Ord Eα and for all ordinals α,
⋃
β<αEβ is an
α-foundational extensor for (P , Ω).
Intuitively, an imperative extensor is a maximal set of hypotheses that will not be
refuted, an implicative extensor is a set of hypotheses that will be confirmed, and
a supporting extensor for P is a set of hypotheses that will be confirmed thanks to
themselves and to the literals generated by P (but not to any nonhypothesis gen-
erated by a rule that fires only thanks to some hypothesis that activates its body).
When the literal marker Ω marks all occurrences of literals that can unify with a
hypothesis (so any hypothesis can be used in any context), supporting extensors
have an alternative definition. This is what the next property expresses, with a
corollary that will be used in relation to the well-founded semantics.
Property 10
Let a formal logic program P = (ϕǫ℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆), a literal marker Ω = (O
ǫ
℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆)
for P , and an extensor E for (P , Ω) be such that for all n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆, n),
ǫ ∈ {+,−}, literals ψ and occurrences o of ψ in ϕǫ℘, if some closed instance of ψ is
an instance of a member of E then o ∈ Oǫ℘. Then E is supporting iff for all ψ ∈ E,
[P ] ∪ E  P [ψ].
Corollary 2
Let a formal logic program P be given. Let a supporting extensor E for (P , 〈·,−〉P)
consist of negated atoms only. Then E is supporting iff for all ψ ∈ E, [P ]∪EP [ψ].
Recall that we have defined a set X of literals to be saturated iff every closed
atom is an instance of a member of at least one of the sets X and ∼X .
Property 11
For all formal logic programs P and literal markers Ω for P , all imperative extensors
for (P , Ω) are saturated.
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Property 12
For all formal logic programs P and literal markers Ω for P , all supporting extensors
for (P , Ω) are implicative.
Property 13
Let a formal logic program P , a literal marker Ω for P , and an extensor E for
(P , Ω) be given.
• For all ordinals α, if E is α-foundational then E is foundational.
• For all ordinals α, if E is α-foundational then E is β-foundational for all
ordinals β > α.
• If E is foundational then there is α ∈ Ord such that E is α-foundational.
It will be shown that the well-founded semantics is related to foundational ex-
tensors, and the answer-set semantics to imperative extensors. As for the stable
model semantics, it will be shown to be related to both imperative and implicative
extensors, by virtue of the following property.
Property 14
For all formal logic programs P , literal markers Ω for P and complete sets E of
literals over V⋆, E is an implicative extensor for (P , Ω) iff E is an imperative
extensor for (P , Ω).
It is fair to say that to cast the answer-set, the stable model and the well-founded
semantics into our framework, it would be sufficient to work under the assumption
that V⋆ = V: either these semantics are developed in a propositional setting, or
they restrict the class of interpretations to Herbrand structures. There is no need
to impose such restrictions, but a natural question is how much more general the
notions become when the equality V⋆ = V is not imposed. In relation to the answer-
set and the stable model semantics, the answer is: not much more. Indeed, the
following proposition establishes that when V⋆ and V are distinct, the notion of
imperative extensor is often degenerate.
Proposition 2
Suppose that V \ V⋆ contains a function symbol of arity 1 at least. Let a formal
logic program P , a literal marker Ω for P , and an imperative extensor E for (P , Ω)
be given. Then for all n ∈ N and ℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆, n), the set of members of [P +Ω E ]
of the form ℘ǫ(t1, . . . , tn) is either empty or equal to the set of all atoms over V⋆ of
the form ℘(t1, . . . , tn) or equal to the set of all negated atoms over V⋆ of the form
¬℘(t1, . . . , tn).
Proof
There is nothing to prove if V contains no constant, so suppose otherwise. Let n ∈ N
and ℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆, n) be given.
• LetX be the set of n-tuples of terms over V⋆, say (t1, . . . , tn), such that for all closed
terms t′1, . . . , t
′
n, if (t
′
1, . . . , t
′
n) is an instance of (t1, . . . , tn) then both ℘(t
′
1, . . . , t
′
n)
and ¬℘(t′1, . . . , t
′
n) are instances of members of E.
32 Éric A. Martin
• For all ǫ ∈ {+,−}, let Xǫ be the set of n-tuples of terms over V⋆, say (t1, . . . , tn),
such that ℘ǫ(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ [P +Ω E ].
Using the fact that E is an imperative extensor for (P , Ω), it is easy to verify that
X , X+ and X− are disjoint and that for all closed terms t1, . . . , tn, (t1, . . . , tn) is
an instance of some member of X ∪X+ ∪X−. Let a nonnullary function symbol f
in V \V⋆ be given. Then there exists an n-tuple (ι1, . . . , ιn) of distinct closed terms
that all start with f . Obviously, for all terms t1, . . . , tn over V⋆, if (ι1, . . . , ιn) is an
instance of (t1, . . . , tn) then t1, . . . , tn are distinct variables. So either all n-tuples of
closed terms are instances of some member of X , in which case [P +Ω E ] contains
no literal over V⋆ of the form ℘(t1, . . . , tn) or ¬℘(t1, . . . , tn), or all n-tuples of closed
terms are instances of some member of X+, in which case [P +Ω E ] contains all
literals over V⋆ of the form ℘(t1, . . . , tn), or all n-tuples of closed terms are instances
of some member of X−, in which case [P +Ω E ] contains all literals over V⋆ of the
form ¬℘(t1, . . . , tn), completing the proof of the proposition.
The following example shows that if V \ V⋆ does not contain a function symbol
of arity 1 at least, then the notion of imperative extensor can be nondegenerate.
Example 5
Suppose that V consists of 0, s and a binary predicate symbol p, and assume that
V
⋆ = {s, p}. Let P be the formal logic program determined by ϕ+p ≡ v1
.
= v2 and
ϕ−p ≡
∨
∅. Let E be the set of literals defined as{
p(v1, v2)
}
∪
{
¬p(sn(v0), v0), ¬p(v0, s
n(v0))
∣∣ n ∈ N \ {0}}.
Set Ω = (∅, ∅). Then E is an imperative extensor for (P , Ω) and [P+ΩE ], which
is obviously equal to [P ], is
{
p(sn(vi), s
n(vi)) | n ∈ N, i ∈ N
}
.
To summarise the previous considerations, we have not assumed in Definition 16
that V⋆ and V are equal simply because none of the results we want to establish
needs that assumption to be made. But the notion of imperative extensor (which
is the key notion in relation to the stable model and the answer-set semantics) is
defined in such a way that it is only interesting when V⋆ = V or when V⋆ and V
take very specific values.
5.3 A few technical results
The results that follow will be used in the sequel.
Lemma 2
Let a formal logic program P and a literal marker Ω for P be given. For all sets E
and F of literals, if E ⊆ F then [P +Ω E ] ⊆ [P +Ω F ].
Proof
Let E and F be two sets of literals with E ⊆ F . It is immediately verified by
induction that for all ordinals α, [P +Ω E ]α ⊆ [P +Ω F ]α. We conclude with
Property 2.
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Lemma 3
Let a formal logic program P and a literal marker Ω for P be given. For all sets E
and F of literals,
[
P +Ω [P +Ω E ] ∪ F
]
⊆ [P +Ω E ∪ F ].
Proof
Let E and F be two sets of literals. Let ordinal λ be such that [P +Ω E ]λ is
equal to [P +Ω E ]λ+1. It is easy to verify by induction that for all ordinals α,
[P +Ω [P +Ω E ] ∪ F ]α ⊆ [P +Ω E ∪ F ]λ+α. We conclude with Property 2.
Lemma 4
For all formal logic programs P , literal markers Ω for P and implicative extensors
E for (P , Ω),
[
P +Ω [P +Ω E ]
]
= [P +Ω E ].
Proof
The lemma follows immediately from Lemmas 2 and 3.
Corollary 3
For all formal logic programs P , literal markers Ω for P and implicative extensors
E for (P , Ω), [P +Ω E ] is an implicative extensor for (P , Ω).
Proposition 3
Let a formal logic program P be locally consistent. Let a literal marker Ω for P be
given. Let a setX of implicative extensors for (P , Ω) be such that
⋃
X is consistent.
Then
⋃
X is an extensor for (P , Ω).
Proof
Write P = (ϕǫ℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆). Set E =
⋃
X . We show by induction that for all ordinals
α, E ∪ [P +Ω E ]α is consistent. Let an ordinal α be given and assume that for all
β < α, E∪ [P+ΩE ]β is consistent. Since P is locally consistent and E is consistent
(used in the case where α = 0), there exists no n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆, n) and closed
terms t1, . . . , tn such that E ∪
⋃
β<α[P +Ω E ]β forces ϕ
+
℘ [t1/v1, . . . , tn/vn] and
ϕ−℘ [t1/v1, . . . , tn/vn]. Hence E ∪ [P+ΩE ]α cannot be inconsistent unless the set of
closed instances of members of [P +Ω E ]α intersects the set of closed instances of
members of ∼E. Assume that the set of closed instances of members of [P +ΩE ]α
indeed intersects the set of closed instances of members of ∼E. Since all members
of X are implicative, any closed instance of any member of E is an instance of some
member of
⋃
F∈X [P +Ω F ]. Let ordinal λ be least such that there exists a closed
literal ϕ with
⋃
F∈X [P +Ω F ]λ ϕ and [P +Ω E ]α ∼ϕ. Let F ∈ X and a closed
literal ϕ be such that [P +Ω F ]λ  ϕ and [P +Ω E ]α ∼ϕ. Set
Y =
⋃
β<λ
[P +Ω F ]β ∪ [P +Ω E ]α.
We derive from the choice of λ that Y is consistent. Let n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆, n) and
terms t1, . . . , tn be such that ϕ is ℘(t1, . . . , tn) or ¬℘(t1, . . . , tn). By the choice of
ϕ, Y forces both ϕ+℘ [t1/v1, . . . , tn/vn] and ϕ
−
℘ [t1/v1, . . . , tn/vn], which is impossible
since P is locally consistent. We conclude that E ∪ [P +Ω E ]α is consistent.
As an immediate consequence of Property 12 and Proposition 3:
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Corollary 4
Let a formal logic program P be locally consistent. Let a literal marker Ω for P be
given. LetX be a set of supporting extensors for (P , Ω) such that
⋃
X is consistent.
Then
⋃
X is a supporting extensor for (P , Ω).
To end this section, let us give a simple application of some of the previous
observations. Complete sets of literals can obviously be identified with standard
structures, hence it is natural to ask whether a complete set of the form [P +Ω E ]
is a model of the classical logical form of P . It is easy to answer that question
positively for implicative extensors.
Proposition 4
Let a formal logic program P , a literal marker Ω for P , and an implicative extensor
E for (P , Ω) be such that [P +Ω E ] is complete. Then the set of closed instances
of atoms in [P +Ω E ] is a model of Clf(P).
Proof
Obviously, for all formulas ϕ and sets O of occurrences of literals in ϕ, ϕ logically
implies ⊚OP+Ω[P+ΩE ]ϕ in W. It follows that Clf(P +Ω [P +Ω E ]) logically implies
Clf(P) in W. By Lemma 4, [P +Ω E ] =
[
P +Ω [P +Ω E ]
]
, and we derive from
Corollary 1 that [P+ΩE ] logically implies Clf(P+Ω [P+ΩE ]) in W. We conclude
that [P +Ω E ] W Clf(P).
5.4 Relationship to the answer-set semantics
In this section we consider the enrichment of Lω1ω(V) with a second negation op-
erator, written not , that can be applied to any literal, and to literals only. We do
not develop the formalism beyond this minimalist syntactic consideration as we use
not to remind the reader of the usual definition of answer-sets, but we will not use
it in an alternative definition of answer-sets that will immediately be seen to be
equivalent to the usual definition. For this purpose, let us introduce some prelimi-
nary notation. Let a formula ϕ and a set O of occurrences of literals in ϕ be given.
We define a member ϕ[O] of the enrichment of Lω1ω(V) with not , thanks to the
inductive construction that follows.
• Suppose that ϕ is an identity, a distinction, or a literal.
— If O = ∅ then ϕ[O] is ϕ.
— If O = {ϕ} and ϕ is an atom then ϕ[O] is not ¬ϕ.
— If O = {ϕ} and ϕ is of the form ¬ψ then ϕ[O] is not ψ.
• Suppose that ϕ is of the form
∨
X or
∧
X . For all ψ ∈ X , let Oψ be the
(unique) set of occurrences of literals in ψ, say o, with o ∪ {ϕ} ∈ O.
— If ϕ is the formula
∨
X then ϕ[O] is
∨
{ψ[Oψ] | ψ ∈ X}.
— If ϕ is the formula
∧
X then ϕ[O] is
∧
{ψ[Oψ] | ψ ∈ X}.
• Suppose that ϕ is of the form ∃xψ or ∀xψ. Let Oψ be the (unique) set of
occurrences of literals in ψ, say o, with o ∪ {ϕ} ∈ O.
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— If ϕ is the formula ∃xψ then ϕ[O] is ∃xψ[Oψ ].
— If ϕ is the formula ∀xψ then ϕ[O] is ∀xψ[Oψ ].
Now let a formal logic program P and a literal marker Ω for P be given. Write
P = (ϕǫ℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆) and Ω = (O
ǫ
℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆), and set P [Ω] =
(
ϕǫ℘[O
ǫ
℘]
)
(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆)
.
Then P [Ω] is what is known in the literature as an extended logic program, a
logic program with two kinds of negation, ¬ and not . Conversely, let an extended
logic program G that, without loss of generality, is written in such a way that for
every n ∈ N and ℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆, n), G has one rule whose head is ℘(v1, . . . , vn), one
rule whose head is ¬℘(v1, . . . , vn), and no other rule whose head is of the form
℘(t1, . . . , tn) or ¬℘(t1, . . . , tn). Then there exists a unique formal logic program P
and a unique literal marker Ω for P with G = P [Ω].
For instance, assume that V consists of 4 nullary predicate symbols p1, p2, p3 and
p4. Suppose that P is given by the following formulas.
ϕ+p1 ≡ p2 ∧ p3 ϕ
+
p2
≡ p4 ϕ
+
p3
≡ p3 ϕ
+
p4
≡ ¬p3
ϕ−p1 ≡ p2 ∨ ¬p4 ϕ
−
p2
≡ ¬p3 ϕ
−
p3
≡ ¬p3 ∧ p2 ϕ
−
p4
≡
∨
∅
Suppose that Ω is given by the following sets.
O+p1 ≡ ∅ O
−
p1
≡
{
{p2 ∨ ¬p4, p2}, {p2 ∨ ¬p4, ¬p4}
}
O+p2 ≡ ∅ O
−
p2
≡ ∅
O+p3 ≡ ∅ O
−
p3
≡
{
{¬p3 ∧ p2, p2}
}
O+p4 ≡
{
{¬p3}
}
O−p4 ≡ ∅
So (P , Ω) can be represented as
p1 ← p2 ∧ p3 p2 ← p4 p3 ← p3 p4 ← ¬p3
X
¬p1 ← p2
X
∨ ¬p4
X
¬p2 ← ¬p3 ¬p3 ← ¬p3 ∧ p2
X
and P [Ω] is the extended logic program
p1 ← p2 ∧ p3 p2 ← p4 p3 ← p3 p4 ← not p3
¬p1 ← not ¬p2 ∨ not p4 ¬p2 ← ¬p3 ¬p3 ← ¬p3 ∧ not ¬p2
Moreover, it is easy to see that the extensors for (P , Ω) are:
• all subsets E of {p1, ¬p1, ¬p2, p3, p4}, in which case [P +Ω E ] = ∅;
• all subsets E of {p1, ¬p1, p2, ¬p2, p3, p4, ¬p4} which contain at least one of
p2 and ¬p4, in which case [P +Ω E ] = {¬p1};
• all subsets E of {p1, ¬p1, p2, ¬p2, p3, ¬p3, p4, ¬p4} which ¬p3 belongs to, in
which case [P +Ω E ] = {¬p1, p2, p4}.
Out of these, only {¬p1, p2, p3, ¬p3, p4} is imperative. Moreover, there is a unique
answer-set for P [Ω], namely {¬p1, p2, p4}.
Having realised that the class of extended logic programs is in one-to-one corre-
spondence with the class of pairs (P , Ω) where P is a formal logic program and Ω
a literal marker for P (the correspondence in question putting a pair of the form
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(P , Ω) in relation to P [Ω]), it is easy to see that if one assumes that V⋆ is equal to
V, then Definition 17 amounts to the notion of an answer-set—recall the discussion
at the end of Section 5.2 about not assuming that V⋆ and V are equal.
Definition 17
Let a formal logic program P and a literal marker Ω for P be given. An answer-
set for (P , Ω ) is a partial interpretation M for which there exists a (necessarily
saturated) set E of literals over V⋆ with the following property.
• For all closed literals ϕ, ϕ ∈M iff ∼ϕ is not an instance of a member of E.
• M is the set of closed instances of members of [P |Ω E ].
The next proposition shows that the concept of imperative extensor fully char-
acterises the notion of answer-set.
Proposition 5
Let a formal logic program P , a literal marker Ω for P , and a set E of literals over
V
⋆ be given. Let F be the set of closed instances of members of E, and let M be
the set of all closed literals ϕ with ∼ϕ /∈ F . Then E is an imperative extensor for
(P , Ω ) iff M is an answer-set for (P , Ω ).
Proof
Assume that E is an imperative extensor for (P , Ω ). By Definition 16, the set of
closed instances of members of [P+ΩE ] is consistent, is precisely equal to M , and
is included in F , which implies by Lemma 1 that [P+ΩE ] = [P |ΩE ]. We conclude
that M is an answer-set for (P , Ω ).
Conversely, assume that M is an answer-set for (P , Ω). Hence M is consistent,
and so M ⊆ F . By Definition 17 and Property 8, M consists of the closed instances
of the members of [P |Ω E ], and so by Lemma 1, consists of the closed instances of
the members of [P +Ω E ]. Hence E is an imperative extensor for (P , Ω ).
In the answer-set semantics, not ϕ intuitively means that ϕ is not provable, that
is, not derived. The way to go from the usual presentation of the answer-set seman-
tics to our setting is to let hypotheses of the form ∼ϕ take effect in contexts where
the answer-set framework has statements of the form “ϕ is not provable.” The fact
that ϕ is either provable or not is then mapped to the constraint, captured by the
notion of imperative extensor, that either ϕ should be derived or ∼ϕ should be
assumed.
5.5 Relationship to the stable model semantics
The stable model semantics takes the sets of positive rules as the object of study;
but as mentioned repeatedly, the class of these sets is in one-to-one correspondence
with the class of symmetric formal logic programs, hence it is legitimate to study
the stable model semantics on the basis of the latter. If one assumes that V⋆ is
equal to V, then Definition 18 captures the notion of stable model—again, recall
the discussion at the end of Section 5.2 about not assuming that V⋆ and V are
equal. Note how Notation 15 is being used in Definition 18 to basically describe the
Lloyd-Topor transformation.
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Definition 18
Let a formal logic program P = (ϕǫ℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆) be given. A partial interpretation
M is said to be stable for P iff there exists a complete set E of literals over V⋆ such
that M is the set of closed instances of members of E and for all closed atoms ϕ,
ϕ ∈M iff {
⊙−Eϕ
+
℘ → ℘(v1, . . . , vn)
∣∣ n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆, n)} W ϕ.
Note that the condition on E only depends on the positive rules of P . In Defi-
nition 18, P is not assumed to be symmetric; but it is essential to assume that P
is symmetric to obtain the result stated in the proposition that follows. Together
with Property 14, this proposition shows that both concepts of imperative and im-
plicative extensors relative to the literal markers that collect all occurrences of all
negated atoms fully characterise the notion of stable model.
Proposition 6
For all symmetric formal logic programs P and complete sets E of literals over V⋆,
the set of closed instances of members of E is stable for P iff E is an implicative
extensor for (P , 〈−,−〉P).
Proof
Let a symmetric formal logic program P = (ϕǫ℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆) and a complete set E of
literals over V⋆ be given. Let E+ be the set of atoms in E, and let E− be the set
of negated atoms in E.
Suppose that the set of closed instances of members of E is stable for P . Then
Clf(P |〈−,−〉P E) logically implies E
+ in W. Since negation does not occur in the left
hand side of any implication in Clf(P |〈−,−〉P E), it follows that E
+ is a subset of
[P|〈−,−〉PE ]. Let n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V
⋆, n), and closed terms t1, . . . , tn be given. Since
E is complete and P is symmetric, E forces one and only one of ϕ+℘ [t1/v1, . . . , tn/vn]
and ϕ−℘ [t1/v1, . . . , tn/vn]. Suppose that ¬℘(t1, . . . , tn) is an instance of a member
of E. If E  ϕ+℘ [t1/v1, . . . , tn/vn] then E
+  ⊙−Eϕ
+
℘ [t1/v1, . . . , tn/vn], hence there
exists terms t′1, . . . , t
′
n over V
⋆ such that (t1, . . . , tn) is an instance of (t′1, . . . , t
′
n)
and ℘(t′1, . . . , t
′
n) ∈ E, contradicting the assumption that E is consistent. We infer
that E+  ⊙−Eϕ
−
℘ [t1/v1, . . . , tn/vn], hence there exists terms t
′
1, . . . , t
′
n over V
⋆
such that (t1, . . . , tn) is an instance of (t′1, . . . , t
′
n) and ¬℘(t
′
1, . . . , t
′
n) belongs to
[P |〈−,−〉P E ]. Suppose that ℘(t1, . . . , tn) is an instance of a member of E. Then
E  ϕ+℘ [t1/v1, . . . , tn/vn], hence E 1 ϕ
−
℘ [t1/v1, . . . , tn/vn], hence E does not force
⊙−Eϕ
−
℘ [t
′
1/v1, . . . , t
′
n/vn] for any terms t
′
1, . . . , t
′
n over V
⋆ such that (t1, . . . , tn) is
an instance of (t′1, . . . , t
′
n). It is then easy to conclude that for all closed literals ϕ,
[P |〈−,−〉P E ]  ϕ iff ϕ is an instance of a member of E. Together with Lemma 1,
this completes the verification that E is an implicative extensor for (P , 〈−,−〉P).
Conversely, assume that E is an implicative extensor for (P , 〈−,−〉P). Since E is
complete, Lemma 1 again implies that [P +〈−,−〉P E ] = [P |〈−,−〉P E ]. Set
X =
{
⊙−Eϕ
+
℘ → ℘(v1, . . . , vn)
∣∣ n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆, n)}.
Clearly, Clf(P |〈−,−〉P E), being logically equivalent in W to the complete set E, is
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also logically equivalent to E−∪X inW. Hence E−∪X W E+. Since negation does
not occur in any implication in X , this implies that X W E+, which completes
the verification that the set of closed instances of members of E is stable for P .
5.6 Supporting and foundational extensors
The well-founded semantics is related to the notion of foundational extensor, and
we will need to establish some of the properties that the latter enjoys in order to
establish the relationship. The notion of supporting extensor has mainly been in-
troduced as a useful building block in the definition of foundational extensors, but
it is interesting in its own right. By Property 12, supporting extensors are implica-
tive extensors, which means that they consist of hypotheses that are guaranteed to
be confirmed. But more is true. Intuitively, given a formal logic program P and a
literal marker Ω for P , a supporting extensor for (P , Ω) is sufficiently rich in liter-
als to ‘generate itself’ using P and Ω, and not contradict any literal generated by
P +ΩE. So for all members ϕ of a supporting extensor E for (P , Ω), there exists a
‘constructive proof’ of ϕ, from the rules formalised as P , such that the only literals
that occur in the proof either are in [P ] or are members of E that occur in contexts
where Ω accepts that they be assumed. The next example will help grasp the idea
in the simple case where Ω accepts that any literal be assumed in any context, and
where no member of [P ] is actually needed in the ‘constructive proofs’.
Example 6
If P is the formal logic program of Example 2 then the supporting extensors for
(P , 〈±,±〉P) which are disjoint from [P ] are the consistent unions of
• {p4(2n) | n ≥ m} where m is an arbitrary member of N,
• {¬p4(2n) | n ≥ m} where m is an arbitrary member of N,
• {p4(2n+ 1) | n ≥ m} where m is an arbitrary member of N,
• {¬p4(2n+ 1) | n ≥ m} where m is an arbitrary member of N,
• {q2, q3},
• {¬q2, ¬q3}, and
• {q4}.
Casting the well-founded semantics into our framework requires to focus on sym-
metric formal logic programs only. But the notion of ⊆-maximal foundational ex-
tensor, which will be seen to formalise the key principle behind the well-founded
semantics, can be applied to arbitrary formal logic programs, hence to P of Ex-
ample 2. For this particular formal logic program, the notion of ⊆-maximal foun-
dational extensor reduces to that of ⊆-maximal supporting extensor; this is be-
cause in this particular case, the process of transfinitely transforming P with a
⊆-maximal supporting extensor converges after its first application. Also, because
of its full bias towards negated atoms, the well-founded semantics elects the literal
marker that marks all occurrences of all negated atoms in the bodies of all rules
or, alternatively, all negated atoms in the bodies of all negative rules (both choices
are equivalent). It will be seen that the well-founded semantics of P is captured
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by the ⊆-maximal set of negated atoms over V⋆ that is a foundational extensor
for (P , 〈−,−〉P) or (P , 〈·,−〉P); with respect to the previous example, that set is
{¬p4(n) | n ∈ N} ∪ {¬q2, ¬q3}.
The ‘dual’ of that semantics would be fully biased towards nonnegated atoms,
and would be captured by the ⊆-maximal set of atoms over V⋆ that is a foundational
extensor for (P , 〈+,+〉P) or (P , 〈+,·〉P) (where 〈+,+〉P and 〈+,·〉P would denote the
literal marker for P that marks all occurrences of all nonnegated atoms in the
bodies of all rules or all positive rules, respectively); in the context of the previous
example, that set is {p4(n) | n ∈ N} ∪ {q2, q3, q4}.
A ‘balanced’ semantics in the family of the semantics determined by maxi-
mal foundational extensors could elect a ⊆-maximal foundational extensor for
(P , 〈±,±〉P) that contains {p4(2n), ¬p4(2n+ 1) | n ∈ N}, and allows one to trans-
form P into a formal logic program that provides a fourth way of generating the
set of even numbers and its complement, using the predicate symbol p4—besides
the three options already available with p1, p2 and p3.
Subsuming the notion of foundational extensor given in Definition 16 is the no-
tion of foundational chain, that we make explicit in order to easily investigate the
properties of the foundational extensors. Given a formal logic program P and a
literal marker Ω for (P , Ω), a foundational chain for (P , Ω) can be described as
follows.
• Start with a supporting extensor E0 for (P , Ω).
• Propose a supporting extensor E1 for (P +Ω E0, Ω+ E0).
• Propose a supporting extensor E2 for (P +Ω E0 ∪E1, Ω+ E0 ∪ E1).
• Etc.
Formally, this translates into the following definition.
Definition 19
Let a formal logic program P and a literal marker Ω for P be given.
Given an ordinal α, an α-foundational chain for (P , Ω) is a sequence (Eβ)β<α of
sets of literals over V⋆ such that for all ordinals β < α, Eβ is a supporting extensor
for (P +Ω
⋃
γ<β Eγ , Ω +
⋃
γ<β Eγ).
A foundational chain for (P , Ω) is a sequence (Eα)α∈Ord of sets of literals over
V
⋆ such that for all ordinals α, (Eβ)β<α is an α-foundational chain for (P , Ω).
Let a formal logic program P and a literal marker Ω for P be given. By Defini-
tions 16 and 19,
• for all α ∈ Ord and α-foundational chains (Eβ)β<α for (P , Ω),
⋃
β<αEβ is an
α-foundational extensor for (P , Ω) and for all foundational chains (Eα)α∈Ord
for (P , Ω),
⋃
α∈OrdEα is a foundational extensor for (P , Ω);
• for all ordinals α and for all α-foundational extensors E for (P , Ω), there
exists an α-foundational chain (Eβ)β<α for (P , Ω) such that E =
⋃
β<αEβ
and for all foundational extensors E for (P , Ω), there exists a foundational
chain (Eα)α∈Ord for (P , Ω) such that E =
⋃
α∈Ord Eα.
The proposition that follows generalises Property 12.
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Proposition 7
For all formal logic programs P and literal markers Ω for P , all foundational ex-
tensors for (P , Ω) are implicative.
Proof
Proof is by induction. Let a formal logic program P , a literal marker Ω for P , and
a foundational chain (Eα)α∈Ord for (P , Ω) be given. Let an ordinal α be given and
suppose that for all β < α,
⋃
γ<β Eγ ⊆ [P+Ω
⋃
γ<β Eγ ]. There is nothing to verify
if α = 0. If α is a limit ordinal then it follows immediately from Lemma 2 that⋃
β<αEβ is included in [P +Ω
⋃
β<αEβ ]. Suppose that α is of the form δ + 1. By
inductive hypothesis,
⋃
γ<δ Eγ is included in [P +Ω
⋃
γ<δ Eγ ]. Moreover, it follows
from Properties 9 and 12 that
[
P+Ω [P+Ω
⋃
γ<δ Eγ ]∪Eδ
]
contains Eδ. Lemma 3
then implies that Eδ ⊆ [P +Ω
⋃
γ≤δ Eγ ]. We conclude with Property 13.
The next proposition will allow us to relate our framework to the well-founded
semantics of a formal logic program P either in terms of a particular foundational
extensor E for (P , 〈·,−〉P), or in terms of [P+〈·,−〉P E ] for a particular foundational
extensor E for (P , 〈,·,−〉P).
Proposition 8
Let a formal logic program P , a literal marker Ω for P , and a foundational extensor
E for (P , Ω) be given. Then [P +Ω E ] is a foundational extensor for (P , Ω).
Proof
By Property 13, choose an ordinal α and an α-foundational chain (Eβ)β<α for
(P , Ω) with
⋃
β<αEβ = E. Set Eα = [P +Ω E ]. Using Property 9, Lemma 4 and
Proposition 7, it is easy to verify that (Eβ)β≤α is an (α+1)-foundational chain for
(P , Ω). We conclude with Property 13 again.
As mentioned in the discussion following Example 6, our framework and the well-
founded semantics of a formal logic program P can be related using either 〈·,−〉P or
〈−,−〉P ; this will be a consequence of the property that follows.
Property 15
Let a formal logic program P and a set E of negated atoms over V⋆ be given.
Then E is a foundational extensor for (P , 〈·,−〉P) iff E is a foundational extensor
for (P , 〈−,−〉P).
We now state a counterpart to Corollary 4 for foundational chains.
Proposition 9
Let a formal logic program P be locally consistent. Let a literal marker Ω for
P and a set I be given. Let a set of foundational chains for (P , Ω) of the form
{(Eσα)α∈Ord | σ ∈ I} be given. Then (
⋃
σ∈I E
σ
α)α∈Ord is a foundational chain for
(P , Ω) iff
⋃
σ∈I
⋃
α∈OrdE
σ
α is consistent.
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Proof
Only one direction of the proposition requires a proof. The argument is by in-
duction. For all ordinals α, set Fα =
⋃
σ∈I E
σ
α. Assume that
⋃
α∈Ord Fα is con-
sistent. Let an ordinal α be given, and assume that for all β < α, (Fγ)γ<β is
a β-foundational chain for (P , Ω). Trivially, if α = 0 or if α is a limit ordinal
then (Fβ)β<α is an α-foundational chain for (P , Ω). Assume that α is of the form
δ + 1. To complete the proof of the proposition, it is clearly sufficient to show that
Fδ ∪
[
(P +Ω
⋃
γ<δ Fγ) +Ω+
⋃
γ<δ Fγ
Fδ
]
is consistent. By Property 9, it suffices to
verify that Fδ∪ [P+Ω
⋃
γ≤δ Fγ ] is consistent. But this is an immediate consequence
of the fact that by Propositions 3 and 7,
⋃
γ≤δ Fγ , equal to
⋃
σ∈I
⋃
γ≤δ E
σ
γ , is an
extensor for (P , Ω).
As an application of Proposition 9, we can follow the main path in the field of
logic programming, be biased towards negative information, and get the following
proposition.
Proposition 10
Let a locally consistent formal logic program P be given.
• There exists a unique ⊆-maximal set E of negated atoms over V⋆ that is a
foundational extensor for (P , 〈·,−〉P), or equivalently, for (P , 〈−,−〉P).
• There exists a unique ⊆-maximal set F of literals over V⋆ that is a founda-
tional extensor for (P , 〈·,−〉P), or equivalently, for (P , 〈−,−〉P); moreover, F is
equal to both [P +〈·,−〉P E ] and [P +〈−,−〉P E ].
Proof
The existence of a unique ⊆-maximal set E of negated atoms over V⋆ that is a
foundational extensor for (P , 〈·,−〉P), or equivalently, for (P , 〈−,−〉P), follows imme-
diately from Proposition 9 and Property 15. Let Ω denote either 〈·,−〉P or 〈−,−〉P .
By Proposition 8, [P +Ω E ] is a foundational extensor for (P , Ω). Let (Fα)α∈Ord
be a foundational chain for (P , Ω). For all ordinals α, let Gα be the set of negated
atoms in Fα. We show that (Gα)α∈Ord is a foundational chain for (P , Ω). Proof is
by induction, so let α ∈ Ord be given, and assume that for all β < α, (Gγ)γ<β is
a β-foundational chain for (P , Ω). Trivially, if α = 0 or α is a limit ordinal then
(Gβ)β<α is an α-foundational chain for (P , Ω). Suppose that α is of the form δ+1.
Obviously, [P +Ω
⋃
β<δ Fβ ] = [P +Ω
⋃
β<δ Gβ ]. This together with the fact that
Fδ is a supporting extensor for
(
[P +Ω
⋃
β<δ Fβ ], Ω +
⋃
β<δ Fβ
)
implies immedi-
ately that Gδ is a supporting extensor for
(
[P +Ω
⋃
β<δ Gβ ], Ω+
⋃
β<δ Gβ
)
, which
completes the proof that (Gα)α∈Ord is a foundational chain for (P , Ω). Obviously,
[P +Ω
⋃
α∈OrdGα ] = [P +Ω
⋃
α∈Ord Fα ]. Moreover,
⋃
α∈OrdGα is a subset of E.
Hence F , which is a subset of [P +Ω
⋃
α∈Ord Fα ] by Proposition 7, is included in
[P +Ω E ] by Lemma 2. Hence [P +Ω E ] is the unique ⊆-maximal set F of literals
over V⋆ that is a foundational extensor for (P , Ω).
5.7 Relationship to the well-founded semantics
The well-founded semantics takes the class of sets of positive rules as object of
study; so again, it is legitimate to study the well-founded semantics on the basis of
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the class of symmetric formal logic programs. But we will see that the hypothesis of
symmetry is unnecessarily strong: it is enough to focus on locally consistent formal
logic programs. If one assumes that V⋆ is equal to V, and if one remains in the
realm of symmetric formal logic programs, then Definition 20 captures the notion
of well-founded model. Here not assuming that V⋆ and V are equal offers a genuine
generalisation.
Definition 20
Let a formal logic program P be given. Define two sequences (E+α )α∈Ord and
(E−α )α∈Ord of sets of literals as follows. Let an ordinal α be given, and assume
that E+β and E
−
β have been defined for all β < α.
• E+α is defined as the set of closed instances of the ⊆-smallest set X of atoms
over V⋆ such that for all ψ ∈ X ,
⋃
β<αE
−
β ∪X forces P [ψ].
• E−α is defined as the set of closed instances of the ⊆-largest set X of negated
atoms over V⋆ such that for all ψ ∈ X ,
⋃
β<αE
+
β ∪X forces P [ψ].
Set E =
⋃
α∈Ord(E
+
α ∪ E
−
α ). If E is a partial interpretation (is consistent), then P
is said to have a well-founded model and E is called the well-founded model of P .
Property 16
Let a formal logic program P = (ϕǫ℘)(℘,ǫ)∈I(V⋆) be given. Let (E
+
α )α∈Ord and
(E−α )α∈Ord be the two sequences of sets of literals defined in Definition 20. Then
for all ordinals α,
{
⊙−⋃
β<α E
−
β
ϕ+℘ → ℘(v1, . . . , vn)
∣∣ n ∈ N, ℘ ∈ Prd(V⋆, n)} W E+α .
Recall that by Proposition 10, we can talk about ‘the ⊆-maximal foundational
extensor for (P , 〈·,−〉P)’ when P is locally consistent. The next proposition shows
that this extensor fully characterises the notion of well-founded model. The propo-
sition does more than embed the well-founded semantics into our framework as it
encompasses all formal logic programs that are locally consistent rather than just
symmetric, and as it does not assume that V⋆ and V are equal.
Proposition 11
Let P be a locally consistent formal logic program, and let F be the ⊆-maximal
foundational extensor for (P , 〈·,−〉P). Then P has a well-founded model, which is
precisely the set of closed instances of members of F .
Proof
Let (E+α )α∈Ord and (E
−
α )α∈Ord be the sequences of literals defined in Definition 20.
For all ordinals α, let D+α be the set of atoms over V
⋆ all of whose closed instances
belong to E+α , and let D
−
α be the set of negated atoms over V
⋆ all of whose closed
instances belong to E−α . Note that for all α ∈ Ord, E
+
α and E
−
α are the sets of closed
instances of members of D+α and D
−
α , respectively. Set E =
⋃
α∈Ord(E
+
α ∪E
−
α ). By
Proposition 10, let (Fα)α∈Ord be a foundational chain for (P , 〈·,−〉P) such that all
members of
⋃
α∈Ord Fα are negated atoms and F = [P +〈·,−〉P
⋃
α∈Ord Fα ].
We first show that for all ordinals α, (D−β )β<α is an α-foundational chain for
(P , 〈·,−〉P). Proof is by induction, so let ordinal α be given, and assume that for
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all β < α, (D−γ )γ<β is a β-foundational chain for (P , 〈·,−〉P). Trivially, if α = 0
or α is a limit ordinal then (D−β )β<α is an α-foundational chain for (P , 〈·,−〉P).
Suppose that α is of the form δ + 1. Let ψ ∈ D−δ be given. Then
⋃
β<δ E
+
β ∪ D
−
δ
forces P [ψ]. Together with Property 16, this implies that [P+〈·,−〉P
⋃
β<δD
−
β ]∪D
−
δ
forces P [ψ], hence also (P +〈·,−〉P
⋃
β<δD
−
β )[ψ], which together with Corollary 2
implies that (D−β )β<α is an α-foundational chain for (P , 〈·,−〉P), as wanted. Now by
the definition of F and Proposition 8, [P +〈·,−〉P
⋃
α∈OrdD
−
α ] is included in F . We
conclude with Lemma 2, Property 16 again and Property 8 that the set of closed
instances of members of F contains E, which is therefore consistent. Hence P has
a well-founded model, which is E.
To establish the converse, we show by induction that for all ordinals α,
• all closed instances of members of Fα belong to E, and
• all closed instances of members of [P +〈·,−〉P
⋃
β<α Fβ ] belong to E.
So let an ordinal α be given and assume that (i) for all ordinals β < α, all closed
instances of members of Fβ belong to E, and (ii) for all ordinals β < α, all closed
instances of members of [P +〈·,−〉P
⋃
γ<β Fγ ] belong to E. Note the following:
(⋆) for all literals ψ over V⋆, (P +〈·,−〉P
⋃
β<α Fβ)[ψ] ∪
⋃
β<α Fβ forces P [ψ].
Let an ordinal δ be such that E = E+δ ∪E
−
δ . Using (⋆), we obtain by induction that
for all γ ∈ Ord and ψ ∈ [P+〈·,−〉P
⋃
β<α Fβ ]γ , if
⋃
β′<γ [P+〈·,−〉P
⋃
β<α Fβ ]β′ forces
(P +〈·,−〉P
⋃
β<α Fβ)[ψ] then
⋃
β′<γ [P +〈·,−〉P
⋃
β<α Fβ ]β′ ∪
⋃
β<α Fβ forces P [ψ];
this together with (i) easily implies that if X+ and X− denote the set of atoms and
the set of negated atoms in
⋃
β′<γ [P +〈·,−〉P
⋃
β<α Fβ ]β′ ∪ {ψ}, respectively, then
• the set of closed instances of members of X+ is included in E+δ+1, and
• the set of closed instances of members of X− ∪
⋃
β<α Fβ is included in E
−
δ+1.
Hence all closed instances of members of [P +〈·,−〉P
⋃
β<α Fβ ] belong to E. Using
(⋆) again, we obtain that for all ψ ∈ Fα, since [P +〈·,−〉P
⋃
β<α Fβ ] ∪ Fα forces
(P +〈·,−〉P
⋃
β<α Fβ)[ψ] by Corollary 2, then E ∪Fα forces P [ψ]; this easily implies
that the set consisting of the closed instances of either the negated atoms in E or
the members of Fα is included in E
−
δ+1. Hence all closed instances of members of
Fα belong to E. Since F is equal to [P +〈·,−〉P
⋃
α∈Ord Fα ], we have shown that
all closed instances of members of F belong to E, which completes the proof of the
proposition.
6 Conclusion
Given a formal logic program P , we have defined the set [P ] of literals generated by
P following a process that can be intuitively described as: fire the rules in P trans-
finitely often, and at each stage interpret disjunction and existential quantification
constructively to determine whether an instance of the body of a rule should be
activated, the rule fired, and the corresponding instance of the head added to [P ].
The view that has been adopted is that [P ] captures the operational semantics of
P . This view is closely related to Kripke-Kleene semantics (this is the contents of
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Proposition 1). We have introduced the notion of ‘literal marker for P ’ to formalise
the intuitive idea of ‘marking some literals in the bodies of some rules in P ’. Given
such a literal marker Ω for P and a set E of literals conceived of as a collection of
hypotheses, meant to be assumed only in the contexts authorised by Ω, we have
formalised the intuitive operation of making these contextual, local assumptions,
resulting in a new formal logic program, denoted P +Ω E; the denotational seman-
tics of that program is of course captured by [P +Ω E ]. For a given literal marker
Ω for P and a given set E of literals, [P +Ω E ] can also be conceived of as an
alternative semantics to P , and we have seen how to choose Ω and E in order to
retrieve the answer-set, the stable model and the well-founded semantics.
• Answer-sets are captured by sets of the form [P +ΩE ] in which Ω marks the
occurrences of literals of the form ¬atom , represented in the usual setting as
not atom, or of the form atom , represented in the usual setting as not ¬atom ,
and E is a maximal (in a strong sense) set of literals that P +Ω E does not
refute (this is the contents of Proposition 5).
• Stable models are captured by sets of the form [P+ΩE ] in which Ω marks all
occurrences of negated atoms in the bodies of all rules, and E is a maximal
set of negated atoms which determines a complete set of literals that P +ΩE
confirms (this is the contents of Proposition 6).
• The well-founded model is the set [P+ΩE ] in which Ω marks all occurrences
of negated atoms in the bodies of all negative rules, and E is the maximal set
of negated atoms that P+ΩE confirms in a strong sense, based on the concept
of a set of hypotheses that can get ‘self-confirmation’ with no additional help
but what can be derived from P itself, put into action transfinitely often (this
is the contents of Propositions 10 and 11).
The relationships have actually been established for a class of logic programs more
general than those usually considered in the literature, but for which those se-
mantics could be naturally adapted. The classes of extensors (legitimate sets of
hypotheses) that have been introduced can be subjected to natural variations; the
choices for Ω can range from fully biased towards negated atoms to fully biased
towards nonnegated atoms, or seek some balance between both kinds of literals,
etc. Hence the three semantics captured by [P +Ω E ] for the specific choices of Ω
and E that have been described are members of families of semantics determined
by a pair (Ω, E) that naturally satisfies more general properties. We have not inves-
tigated these alternative semantics for lack of space, but we think that one of the
main contributions of this paper is to have laid the foundation for such a work, with
applications to hypothetical reasoning in knowledge-based systems, where hypothe-
ses are applied locally and contextually, and are constrained to satisfy variations
on properties such a confirmation or nonrefutation.
Though Kripke-Kleene, the answer-set, the stable model and the well-founded
semantics are expressed in terms of ‘intended’ or ‘preferred’ models, we do not view
[P ] as the intended model of what we have called the classical logical form, denoted
Clf(P), of the formal logic programP . Indeed, we have carefully not defined a formal
logic program as a set of logical formulas. We have chosen to model the behavior of a
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set of rules that can fire transfinitely often, hence provide an operational semantics,
which does not require to represent rules as logical implications. Another paper will
present a declarative semantics, in such a way that
{
ϕ | ϕ ∈ [P ]
}
is precisely
the set of formulas of the form ϕ with ϕ a literal that are logical consequences of
a set of modal formulas that is obtained from Clf(P) by preceding all occurrences
of literals with the modal operator of necessity. (The main work is to capture
properly the transformation of P into P +Ω E—marking literals has to find its
logical counterpart—, and to properly represent the hypotheses). In this setting,
‘logical consequence’ is interpreted classically, that is, in reference to a notion of
interpretation that generalises the interpretations used in epistemic logic, in which
every formula is either true or false (not undefined), negation is classical, and the
law of excluded middle holds but is irrelevant, because a rule such as q ← p ∨ ¬p
is logically translated into p ∨¬p→ q: to derive q, derive p or derive ¬p, and
q ← p ∨ ¬p does not automatically fire because p ∨¬p is not valid.
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